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We dedicate this edition of the Southern California International Review
to those that critically study the past to seek answers for the future.

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Editor's Note:

Dear Reader,

It is with great pleasure that I introduce to you the twenty-second edition of the Southern California International Review (SCIR). This semester's issue continues our mission of providing a platform for undergraduate scholars of international affairs to deliver their work to a larger, global audience.

We were incredibly fortunate to have dozens of submissions for this issue. Our editors spent staunch hours examining undergraduate research from all across the country and throughout the world. Of the many impressive submissions, the following five were outstanding for their original ideas and fresh perspectives on globalization topics. As you read this journal, you will understand why.

In the creation of this issue, the SCIR is extremely appreciative of the support of the University of Southern California's School of International Relations Director Saori Katada, Associate Director Linda Cole, Professor Wayne Sandholtz, and the rest of the faculty and staff that give us the guidance we need to steadily grow. I also extend our thanks to Ms. Robin Friedheim for her generous scholarship that provides the foundation upon which our endeavor thrives.

Our four selected articles each approach a specific issue in different corners of the world—this is a theme that unifies this edition. The first article analyzes the role informal actors play in migration diplomacy, such as in the U.S. and Mexico and Turkey and Germany. Our second article explores the vulnerabilities and potential for schism in the Russian Orthodox Church, and the third article examines indigenous representation in the Arctic Council. The fourth article analyzes how Italian pride parades are portrayed and framed in both Bologna and Rome. Each author has carefully dissected their topics, completed original research, and presented their findings with professionalism that makes a meaningful contribution to the study of international affairs.

I would like to thank you, the reader, since without you, we are nothing. Remember, the content of this journal is just one part of a much larger dialogue.

Please read, ponder, explore, and enjoy.

Warm regards,
Piya Garg
Editor-in-Chief

Expanding the Diplomatic Toolbox:

How Informal Actors Shape Inter-State Migration Diplomacy

Natalia Lopez

Defined as a state's use of diplomatic tools to manage cross-border population movement, migration diplomacy is a presently evolving field of study. Most of the established frameworks of migration diplomacy focus on formal inter-state levels of analysis. Inter-state relations, however, can also be shaped by informal interactions, most notably with the engagement of non-governmental actors. This research paper expands the theoretical framework of migration diplomacy by including and defining informal migration diplomacy and further analyzes the composition of actors and processes involved in how this type of diplomacy practically operates.

1. Introduction:

With the global count of international migrants reaching 281 million in 2020, migration has become an increasingly relevant consideration in inter-state engagement.¹ Defined generally as a state's use of diplomatic tools and policies to manage cross-border population movement, migration diplomacy is a presently evolving field of study, one that aims to continually define the theoretical frameworks explaining how and why a state engages in this strand of diplomacy. Most of the established definitions and frameworks of migration diplomacy focus on broader and more formal inter-state/inter-governmental levels of analysis. However, like other realms of diplomacy, inter-state relations can also be shaped by more informal interactions, most notably with the engagement of non-state and non-governmental actors. Using qualitative case study analyses of two prominent global migration networks, this research paper aims to bring into question how informal diplomacy, or engagement between actors that do not partake in traditional inter-state and inter-governmental diplomatic interactions, shapes how a state creates formal policies to manage migration flows. Applying established models of determining the influence of informal diplomatic actors in policy-making, I argue that generally, three main types of actors emerge as foremost figures in the sphere of informal migration diplomacy: non-governmental organizations, academic think tanks and institutions, and labor organizations. Depending on the social, political, and economic context of the migration network and the country that they are located within, these actors all have varying levels of influence in shaping formal migration policy. This research paper outlines a definition of informal migration diplomacy and then presents relevant evidence to further articulate

¹ United Nations, "International Migration 2020 Highlights," United Nations, Accessed May 7, 2022

NATALIA LOPEZ is a recent graduate from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, where she majored in International Politics, minored in Spanish, and received a Certificate in Diplomatic Studies.

the composition of actors and processes involved in how this type of diplomacy practically operates.

The structure of this paper begins with an introduction to the importance of defining and evaluating informal migration diplomacy as well as the principal questions and arguments pursued. The second section includes a literature review of both informal diplomacy and migration diplomacy, as well as models to evaluate diplomatic influence. This section will then be followed by a brief analysis of the study's methodology as well as a section summarizing definitions found in this research paper. The bulk of the paper will review the landscape analysis of the two proposed case studies and discuss the presence of informal diplomatic actors as well as their influence in creating migration diplomacy. The final section will summarize main conclusions and provide recommendations for further research.

2. Literature Review:

The Role of Informal Diplomacy

According to the National Museum of American Diplomacy, the act of diplomacy seeks to “build and maintain relationships and conduct negotiations with people using tact and mutual respect.”² In the foreign policy sphere, the cultivated relationships and shared negotiations between states and with other actors are the foundation of the world's cross-border, diplomatic network. Personnel and institutions involved in diplomatic processes interact with each other at different levels to ensure that resulting relationships and negotiations can develop policies that are both comprehensive and effective in their implementation. These diplomatic interactions are usually categorized into two typologies: formal and informal diplomacy. Formal diplomacy is defined by former diplomat Jose Calvet De Magalhaes as “an instrument of foreign policy for the establishment and development of contacts between the governments of different states through the use of intermediaries mutually recognized by the respective parties.”³ It is also colloquially referred to as “government-to-government” diplomacy as well as “Track 1 diplomacy.” This type of diplomacy is distinguished through its use of officially established channels to engage in diplomatic interactions on the state-to-state level. The actors in this form of diplomacy are usually official diplomats or high-ranking state officials, who then interact through several types of communication channels (meetings, summits, written and virtual communiques, etc.) with officials of other states or of global multilateral institutions.⁴ Informal diplomacy, however, encompasses a broader range of actors in diplomatic interactions beyond politicians and bureaucrats. The framework and definitions of informal di-

2 “Diplomacy-National Museum of American Diplomacy,” National Museum of American Diplomacy, Accessed May 7, 2022.

3 Jose Calvet De Magalhaes, *The Pure Concept of Diplomacy*, vol. 214 (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1988).

4 De Magalhaes, *The Pure Concept of Diplomacy*, 19

plomacy that will be used throughout this paper draw heavily from the framework created by researchers Elena Douglas and Diane Stone, which incorporates several categories of “informal diplomacy” in order to define and interpret real-world diplomatic interactions.⁵ This framework incorporates three distinct types of informal diplomatic tracks: Track 1.5 (T1.5), Track 2 (T2), and Track 3 (T3) diplomacy.

The term “Track 2 diplomacy” was first coined by retired diplomat Joe Montville, who uses this term to define the informal interactions that might occur between members of adversary groups or nations through the use of intermediaries in order to reach a consensus or solution to conflict.⁶ Douglas and Stone further expand on Montville’s explanation to include long-term consensus building and friendship management as included goals of informal diplomacy, which is officially defined as “unofficial dialogues often facilitated by an impartial Third Party and involving individuals with some connections to their respective official communities, focused on co-operative efforts to explore new ways to resolve differences over, or discuss new approaches to, policy-relevant issues.”⁷ In contrast to what we refer to as Track 1 (T1) or “formal diplomacy,” T2 diplomacy encompasses informal diplomatic interactions between actors that are not actively a part of official diplomatic institutions of the state but do have connections to the actors involved in the formal policy-making process, including retired diplomats or policymakers. Though not always the case, these types of interactions also usually include an aspect of novelty, where discussions of new perspectives and different directions to take in creating policies are at the forefront.

The framework used by Douglas and Stone also includes both T1.5 and T3 diplomacy. T1.5 diplomacy is a term that attempts to explain diplomatic interactions that occur between both formal and informal actors. This concept was first defined in detail by diplomacy scholar Jeffrey Mapendere as “peacemaking activities undertaken by non-political third parties between high political representatives of warring groups, or governments.”⁸ Douglas and Stone expand this definition beyond a context of conflict and utilize it to describe any sort of interaction or connection between formal diplomatic personnel and non-governmental, informal actors engaging in communication that would influence the formal policy-making process.⁹ Additionally, Douglas and Stone mention T3 diplomacy,

5 Elena Douglas and Diane Stone, “The Informal Diplomacy of the Australian American Leadership Dialogue,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 69, no. 1 (2015): 20.

6 J.V. Montville and United States Information Service, *The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy*, Special Feature (United States Information Service): Conflict Resolution : Parameters and Possibilities (United States Information Service, 1993)

7 Douglas & Stone, “The Informal Diplomacy,” 23.

8 Jeffrey Mapendere, “Defining Track One and a Half Diplomacy: Its Complementarity and the Analysis of Factors That Facilitate Its Success,” 2002.

9 Douglas & Stone, “The Informal Diplomacy,” 24.

which is referenced as diplomacy that occurs “among civil society groups and individuals and is more strictly non-governmental.”¹⁰ These diplomatic interactions are usually at the societal level, and while still important in cultivating state-to-state relationships, they do not have as much of an impact on the formal policy-making process beyond the possibility of swaying public opinion.

The Current Model of Migration Diplomacy

The concept of “migration diplomacy,” or linking the management of migratory networks with the diplomatic goals and processes of a state, is a fairly recent sphere of inquiry within the international migration research field. This is in large part due to the significant growth in migration that has occurred throughout our increasingly globalized and transnational world. International migrants now make up almost 3.6 percent of the global population, over three times the estimated number defined in 1970.¹¹ In fact, scholar James Hollifield has described the modern state as a “migration state” because of how important the management of cross-border population flows has become in the scheme of state-to-state interactions.¹² The actual theoretical concept of “migration diplomacy” was first defined and described by migration researchers Fiona Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas as “a state’s use of diplomatic tools, processes, and procedures to manage cross-border population mobility.”¹³ Migration policy is not just an intra-state affair, but rather inter-state, where countries also would “use diplomatic means to obtain goals relating to migration.”¹⁴ In their definition, Adamson and Tsourapas underscore the necessary linkage between state diplomatic aims and their management of cross-border populations in practicing migration diplomacy. While migration policies, such as visa agreements and asylum and border policies, can be used as tools to obtain goals relating to migration, they are not “in and of themselves elements of migration diplomacy” unless their implementation has diplomatic motivations.¹⁵

The definition used by Adamson and Tsourapas primarily presents a realist view of state function, as it centers states as the main actors and their interests as the main drivers surrounding diplomatic relations involving migration. Several studies, however, have expanded this definition to include actors outside of the state apparatus. Migration expert H el ene Thiollet describes the informal politics of labor migration in the Middle East as

10 Ibid.

11 “UNHCR - Asylum and Migration,” accessed May 7, 2022.

12 James F. Hollifield, “The Emerging Migration State,” *The International Migration Review* 38, no. 3 (2004): 890.

13 Fiona B. Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas, “Migration Diplomacy in World Politics,” *International Studies Perspectives* 20, no. 2 (2019): 115.

14 Adamson & Tsourapas, “Migration Diplomacy,” 117.

15 Ibid.

“including formal and informal, public and private diplomacy.”¹⁶ Labor movements in this region have “bypassed the channels of formal and informal institutions and agreements” and have been shaped by “the decisions of both public and private actors...and by firms and recruitment companies on a contractual business basis.”¹⁷ Ilan Kelman, in his exploration of the concept of “disaster diplomacy” and migration management following increased global climate change, also finds that informal actors play an important role in “disaster”-related diplomatic interactions. ¹⁸“Individuals, non-sovereign jurisdictions, the private sector, and all forms of non-governmental organizations” are all a part of the diplomatic ecosystem that is involved when managing increased climate-change related migration.¹⁹

While these recent studies have hinted at the informal diplomatic relations that occur within migration diplomacy, this study seeks to formalize this phenomenon within the broader “migration diplomacy” framework while then surmising general patterns of engagement between informal diplomatic actors. Migration diplomacy can only be fully conceptualized by further understanding the concept of “informal migration diplomacy”, or the use of informal diplomatic tools, processes, and procedures by informal actors to further policies managing migration within the state in line with the actors’ own interests. Through this expanded definition, clearer insights can be made not only into the processes between diplomatic engagements between states about migration, but also about overall state priorities and interests.

Evaluating “Diplomatic Influence”

Much research has been done considering the most effective ways to evaluate and measure the effects of both formal and informal “diplomatic influence” on the formal policy making process. Diplomacy scholar James Pamment presents a model of evaluating the influence of informal diplomacy that focuses on four different frameworks: output models, outcome models, perception models, and network models.²⁰ In this study, Pamment’s output model and network model will be used in order to evaluate the presence and subsequent influence of informal actors on policymaking in the migration diplomacy sphere. These models were chosen because of their congruence with currently available data and literature, as perception and outcome models require additional qualitative

16 Helene Thiollet, “Migration as Diplomacy: Labor Migrants, Refugees, and Arab Regional Politics in the Oil-Rich Countries,” *International Labor and Working-Class History* 79, no. 1 (2011): 106.

17 Thiollet, “Migration as Diplomacy,” 107.

18 Ilan Kelman, “Reflections on Disaster Diplomacy for Climate Change and Migration,” in *Identifying Emerging Issues in Disaster Risk Reduction, Migration, Climate Change and Sustainable Development* (Springer, 2017), 199.

19 Kelman, “Reflecting on Disaster Diplomacy,” 199.

20 James Pamment, “Articulating Influence: Toward a Research Agenda for Interpreting the Evaluation of Soft Power, Public Diplomacy and Nation Brands,” *Public Relations Review* 40, no. 1 (2014): 53.

data in order to be utilized. Pamment's output model focuses on actors' outputs, such as research publications and/or presentations given to formal diplomatic actors, as a measure of influence on the formal policy making process.²¹ Her network model focuses on personal or professional human connection and their role in sharing knowledge and interests with formal diplomatic actors as relevant measures of policy making influence.²² By evaluating the contributions of the informal actors presented in the following case studies through these models of influence, diplomatic influence can be gauged within this research paper relating to how the presented informal diplomatic actors contribute to formal policy making and in developing and sustaining migration diplomacy.

3. Defining Key Terms

Several new definitions will be utilized within this research paper in reference to the proposed expanded model of migration diplomacy. The definition of "formal migration diplomacy" utilized in this paper is in line with that proposed by Adamson and Tsourapas, which is "a states' use of diplomatic tools, processes, and procedures to manage cross-border population mobility."²³ States will use formal means of diplomacy to create migration policies that are in direct alignment with diplomatic priorities. When using formal diplomacy, formal diplomatic actors will further migration policies that are in direct alignment with that of their state's interests, acting as vehicles of state power. In the context of migration diplomacy, formal diplomatic actors are usually from a state's own government and are tasked with and have a direct stake in creating and implementing a state's migration policies. It is important to note that within this definition, all the migration policies of a state are not necessarily a part of migration diplomacy, unless they are created and implemented to further a state's diplomatic objectives.

Informal migration diplomacy is defined in this paper as "the use of informal diplomatic tools, processes, and procedures by informal diplomatic actors to further migration policies in line with the actors' own interests." Informal diplomatic actors have agency in being able to use their diplomatic interactions to endorse and bolster migration policies that are either in alignment with or against a state's interests. Informal diplomatic actors participating in Track 1.5 and Track 2 diplomacy do not have a direct ability to create and implement migration policy. However, they do have a direct connection and can influence the formal actors who do engage in the formal policy making process.²⁴

21 Pamment, "Articulating Influence," 53.

22 Pamment, "Articulating Influence," 54.

23 Adamson & Tsourapas, "Migration Diplomacy," 116.

24 See the above section: "Evaluating Diplomatic Influence"

4. Methodology

A qualitative case study methodology was used to further analyze the research questions proposed within this study. This methodology was selected because a qualitative data approach provides the best method of understanding how these actors might interact within knowledge and network-sharing frameworks. The migration networks between Mexico and the United States as well as between Germany and Turkey were selected because there is considerable information and research available about these four countries and their formal and informal diplomatic processes. These countries also have similar multifaceted diplomatic approaches to managing migration, as well as similar types of migratory movement (i.e., labor migration, refugee movement). These similarities will hopefully lead to a conclusive understanding of general patterns involving informal migration diplomacy that can be further understood and nuanced in future research studies.

An initial deep dive was undertaken into the available literature about the two migratory networks, including a history of migration patterns between the two states and a history of the course of established diplomatic relations. The period length of this study is based on the initial date when formal diplomatic interactions were formed between the two states in each case study, however, there is an emphasis on diplomatic interactions within the last 20 years in order to capture modern day migratory movements between states. Through this initial literature review, the primary categories of informal actors to be further analyzed were recorded (think tanks and academic institutions, non-governmental organizations, and labor organizations). Further primary and secondary document analysis were reviewed in order to provide evidence for the role of these informal diplomatic actors in influencing migration policy. Several informal expert interviews were conducted in order to better contextualize the work of these informal actors and to ensure that a thorough landscape analysis of informal migration diplomacy was created for each case study. Conclusions and potential policy recommendations were then extracted from these assessments.

5. Informal Diplomacy Landscape Analysis - The United States and Mexico

The United States and Mexico have a long history of a strong diplomatic relationship. With a shared border over 2,000 miles long, ties between the two states go beyond official diplomatic relations and extends to deep and immersive sociocultural, educational, and economic ties. The United States officially recognized Mexico diplomatically in 1822, directly following Mexico's own fight for independence from colonial rule.²⁵ While the following century held several instances where these diplomatic ties were severed, diplomatic relations have remained established since 1917.²⁶ Since then, the United States and Mexico

25 Lynn Stephen, "Towards a Transborder Perspective: US-Mexico Relations," *Iberoamericana*, 2012, 87.

26 Stephen, "Towards a Transborder Perspective," 88.

have collaborated bilaterally on several important issues, including economic development and trade, security concerns, and cultural and scientific exchange. Historically, the management of migration between these two countries has been an important aspect of inter-state relations. While in the past these migratory movements and subsequent policies have focused mainly on labor migration, modern day migratory movements between the two countries have evolved to include many different types of populations as well as collaboration to stem other countries' migration flows.

In relation to the informal diplomatic interactions between Mexico and the United States regarding migration, three categories of actors have been found to have the most deciding influence on the policymaking process. This includes academic think tanks and institutions, non-governmental organizations, and labor organizations. The following section analyzes examples of the following institutions in order to better understand the informal diplomacy landscape between these two countries.

Academic think tanks and institutions are the main agents of informal migration diplomacy between the United States and Mexico. Because of these countries' long shared history of migration, there are a multitude of informal diplomatic engagements facilitated by think tanks as well as academic institutions in order to better contextualize and understand modern-day migration issues. These institutions create spaces of free discussion where thoughtful engagement with these issues can be construed among professionals, policymakers, and academics without the pressure of consequential policymaking or political maneuvering.²⁷ While some think tanks might not convene specifically to talk about migration, issues of mobility and migration policy inevitably come up as part of the discussion and as part of issued recommendations to policymakers. Think tanks and academic institutions notably engage heavily in both T2 and T1.5 diplomacy, creating spaces of engagement for informal diplomatic personnel as well as spaces for meetings between formal and informal actors. These institutions also produce considerable research and presentation output as well as facilitate network engagement and creation.

Academic think tanks and institutions have a long-established record of bringing together policymakers as well as academics, researchers, and heads of NGOs and private corporations from both the United States and Mexico to discuss relevant migration policy issues. One such example includes the U.S.-Mexico Binational Council. Established in the early 2000s, this group met several times to discuss relevant policy issues concerning both the US and Mexico, including migration.²⁸ Policy recommendations coming from several extensive meetings between both informal and formal diplomatic actors (T1.5) were then presented to both country's executives as well as the U.S.-Mexico Interparliamentary

27 Alejandra Salas-Porras, "Democracy, Civil Society and the Strategies Pursued by Think Tanks in Mexico," in *Critical Perspectives on Think Tanks* (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021): 64.

28 "Release of the Latest U.S.-Mexico Binational Council Report," accessed May 7, 2022.

Group.²⁹ Another such event, named the High-Level Innovation Forum for Mexican Policymakers, had also been hosted by the Wilson Center's Mexican Institute in the 2010s.³⁰ This forum brought together Mexican policymakers and United States academics and professionals to discuss promoting innovation and growth in both the Mexican and United States economies.³¹ With these policy recommendations came discussions of creating pathways of shared knowledge through more dynamic migratory pathways for technology professionals, which were then also presented to the United States Executive and to members of Congress.³² While most academic think tanks and institutions aim to host events that include conversations with current policymakers and diplomatic actors (Track 1.5), they are also known to host a multitude of events that follow a Track 2 diplomatic approach. The US-Mexico Foundation, another non-profit dedicated to advancing dialogues about these state's bilateral relations, hosts U.S.-Mexico 360, which brings together United States and Mexican leaders from various sectors (businesses, think tanks, universities, and research centers, and civil associations) to discuss the topics related to the bilateral relationship, including migration and national security.³³ These recommendations are also presented to policymakers following the event's conclusion.³⁴ The University of Texas at Austin's Mexico Center hosts the annual Austin Lecture on Contemporary Mexico, which brings together United States and Mexican academics to discuss bilateral policy issues like migration and concludes with a summative research and recommendation overview.³⁵ Overall, academic think tanks and institutions play a necessary role in facilitating the springboard in which informal diplomatic interactions can be used to inform and influence migration policies. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also a major player in the informal diplomatic landscape between the United States and Mexico, though they usually work in a more multilateral framework to discuss migration policies and bring together multiple organizations to discuss migration issues and policy solutions.³⁶ These organizations are more advocacy and program-focused, usually with sustained, on-the-ground engagement with local communities. By bringing organizational expertise of various topics to the table, these larger coalitions and working groups can form broader recommendation lists.³⁷ While some NGOs host events and forums that involve some formal diplomatic actors to create T1.5 events, most of these organizations

29 Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Release of the Latest U.S.-Mexico Binational Council Report."

30 "Second Annual High-Level Innovation Forum for Policymakers | Wilson Center," accessed May 7, 2022.

31 Wilson Center, "Second Annual High-Level Innovation Forum for Policymakers."

32 *Ibid.*

33 "USMexico 360 — US-Mexico Foundation," accessed May 7, 2022.

34 *Ibid.*

35 "Austin Lecture on Contemporary Mexico Presents Jesús Silva-Herzog Márquez," accessed May 7, 2022.

36 Ruben Hernandez-Leon, "The Migration Industry in the Mexico-US Migratory System," 2005: 9.

37 Hernandez-Leon, "The Migration Industry," 9.

host T2 diplomatic events that aim to bring together professionals, advocates, and academics in order to foster policy dialogue. These dialogues usually conclude and are codified in written reports and publications that are also shared with the broader public as well as formal policymakers and diplomatic actors. Sin Fronteras, one of the leading NGOs in Mexico working on migrant issues, convened many regional organizations, including those from the United States, to make public recommendations about policies related to the international protection and integration of refugees and asylum seekers.³⁸ Many NGOs also have several on the ground locations that span across both countries, making coordinated advocacy efforts more reliable and accessible. This type of organization framework is unique in the sense that although knowledge sharing and informal diplomatic engagement may seem unilateral, both offices act as their own entity in sharing and bringing the perspective of the reality on the ground to then convert to actionable knowledge and policy recommendations. For example, Kids in Need of Defense (KIND), an international NGO dedicated to protecting the rights of children, has both a Mexico and United States based office. Both offices have a long history of coordination of sharing research and creating publications that are then brought forward to national and policy making bodies in order to create more equitable and safe policies for migrant children both while they are in transit as well as when they arrive to their country of destination.³⁹ While less frequent, NGOs do participate in Track 1.5 diplomacy, usually in the form of broader regional forums and working groups to influence migration policy. For example, the prominent NGO network called the Regional Network of Civil Organizations for Migration (Red Regional de Organizaciones Civiles para las Migraciones), is invited by the member countries to act as active participants in policy discussions between formal representatives of Member States and represent the needs and interests of NGOs working in the region as well as represent the needs of migrant populations.⁴⁰ The representatives of the different countries, including the United States and Mexico, as well as NGO representation work to produce policy recommendations for formal government institutions in dealing with both regional and bilateral migration.⁴¹

Labor migration between the United States and Mexico has always been a significant theme in migration policy. Labor migration policies between the two countries used to be a main source of both contention and collaboration in terms of diplomatic policies but has shifted in recent years due to the changing populations migrating between the two countries. Much labor movement is now regulated by the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), a formal treaty replacing the North American Free Trade Agree-

38 "Informes Temáticos – Sin Fronteras IAP," accessed May 7, 2022.

39 "KIND México - KIND," accessed May 7, 2022.

40 "Civil Society | Regional Conference on Migration," accessed May 7, 2022.

41 Regional Conference on Migration, "Civil Society."

ment (NAFTA) established in 1994. The USMCA has some of the strongest and most comprehensive labor regulations in any treaty signed by the United States. The agreement contains an entire chapter on labor and regulation of labor movement, as well as a provision protecting rights of migrant workers.⁴² While the majority labor migration policies are thus now conducted at the formal diplomatic level, some labor organizations do engage in informal diplomacy in order to advocate for worker's rights. For example, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the largest federation of unions in the United States, has worked with Mexican and United States NGOs in order to produce research and publications aimed at reforming labor migration policies from both countries.⁴³ While their stake is not as pronounced as in previous decades, labor organizations still have a hand in the informal diplomatic process.

6. Informal Diplomacy Landscape Analysis - Turkey and Germany

Similar to the relationship between the United States and Mexico, Germany and Turkey have a long history of shared diplomatic relations as well as inter-state migratory movements. While formal diplomatic relations were established in 1914 shortly after the outbreak of World War I, migration became a salient policy issue between the two countries beginning in the 1950s and 1960s.⁴⁴ Because of Germany's need for a bigger national labor force following World War II, bilateral labor exchange agreements were established between the two countries.⁴⁵ Germany's need for imports of external labor declined later in the 1980s, shifting the flow and nature of migratory movements for the next three decades.⁴⁶ Following political unrest in Turkey, asylum seekers and irregular migrants then became the most common migratory populations arriving into Germany. While modern migration diplomacy and diplomatic policies between the two countries still do focus on labor, there is now also a major focus on diaspora policies and the issue of transnational families and relationships.

In relation to the informal diplomatic interactions between Turkey and Germany regarding migration, the three categories of actors, academic think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and labor organizations, were found to have the most deciding

42 David A Gantz, "The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement: Overview and Analysis," Baker Institute Report 12 (2018): 2.

43 "Mexico | AFL-CIO," accessed May 7, 2022.

44 Yaşar Aydın, "The Germany-Turkey Migration Corridor: Refitting Policies for a Transnational Age," migrationpolicy.org, February 18, 2016, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/germany-turkey-migration-corridor-refitting-policies-transnational-age>

45 Aydın, "The German Turkey Migration Corridor."

46 Ibid.

influence on the policymaking process. The following section analyzes examples of the following institutions in order to better understand the informal diplomacy landscape between these two countries.

While labor migration has shifted from being the main migration policy focus between the two countries, it still holds a prominent role as one of the main topics under which informal diplomatic relations occur between these two countries. Turkey and Germany no longer have an institutionalized bilateral labor exchange agreement. The labor migration patterns have shifted from low-skilled workers moving into Germany primarily from Turkey to a much more transverse movement where students, as well as high-skilled workers, travel between the two countries for labor-related opportunities.⁴⁷ Policy recommendations have thus shifted from focusing on labor migration to policies that promote skilled worker migration. For example, the German-Turkish Chamber of Industry and Commerce (AHK Turkey) is part of the worldwide network of German Chambers of Commerce Abroad (AHK) and is an important platform for bilateral economic exchange.⁴⁸ Good and sustainable relationships and an effective exchange of information between public institutions, German and Turkish associations, and the members of the chamber enable joint projects to be implemented and promote economic relations between Turkey and Germany.⁴⁹ They also host working groups that produce policy papers, many in reference to labor migration and the mobility of potential workers. Similarly, the Association of Turkish-German Businessmen in Berlin-Brandenburg is an organization that sees itself as the voice of the Turkish economy working within Germany and advocates for advancing the economic integration of Turkish migrants within Germany.⁵⁰ This organization represents Turkish interests in many state-sponsored forums and meetings and also participates directly in regional economic bodies, including the Alliance for Economy and Employment in Berlin.⁵¹

The think tank landscape varies quite differently between Turkey and Germany. Germany has a long and robust history of think tanks and institutional involvement in the formal policy-making process, though still not as extensive as the United States. Specifically related to migration, German think tanks that research and publish recommendations related to migratory policies are a part of the collective German Advisory Council

47 Ibid.

48 "Arbeitsgruppen," AHK Türkei, accessed May 7, 2022, <https://www.dtr-ihk.de/mitgliedschaft/arbeitsgruppen>.

49 Ibid.

50 Anna Amelina and Thomas Faist, "Turkish Migrant Associations in Germany: Between Integration Pressure and Transnational Linkages," *Revue Européenne Des Migrations Internationales* 24, no. 2 (2008): 93.

51 Ibid.

on Integration and Migration.⁵² This collective acts as the center of think tank thought related to migration policies in Germany.⁵³ Comparatively, Turkish think tanks do not have a long-established history in the Turkish policymaking sphere. Think tanks in Turkey began to be established in the 1960s and have only recently become subjects of research and inquiry.⁵⁴ They are, however, increasingly becoming an involved actor in the creation of Turkish foreign policy, specifically regarding migration diaspora politics.⁵⁵ Therefore, informal diplomatic engagement between this category of institutions is limited because of the smaller number of active think tanks in Germany. Think tanks are involved on a limited basis, with most of their engagement following Track 2 diplomatic interactions and resulting in mostly research and presentation output rather than network facilitation. For example, Turkish think tanks like the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmalar Vakfı), or SETA, have established several projects that have brought together German academics and professionals along with other state professionals in order to discuss diaspora policies as well as published relevant research regarding these policies.⁵⁶ It is important to note that unlike most of the think tanks in the United States and Mexico, some Turkish think tanks are not separate from state and formal diplomatic interests. Allegiance or loyalty to state or political interests could halt a think tank's agency from advocating for migration policies that might go against the interests of the state.⁵⁷ Therefore, it is important to first unpack the added layer of research independence to truly conceptualize the informal diplomatic influence of Turkish think tanks.

NGOs also have a role in the promotion of specific diaspora and integration-related policies; however, they are not as prominent as academic think tanks. Turkish NGOs focus mainly on in-country refugee and asylum-seeker issues, especially since Turkey's evolution into a receiving state following significant regional migratory shifts.⁵⁸ Since most German migrants in Turkey are not actively asylum-seekers or refugees, bilateral informal diplomatic advocacy is not as prominent as we have seen between the United States and Mexico. However, Turkish migrant NGOs still play an important role in mediating between governments, civil society, and other institutions in advocating and influencing

52 "Expert Council on Integration and Migration GGmbH – Sachverständigenrat Für Integration Und Migration GGmbH," accessed May 7, 2022, <https://www.svr-migration.de/en/>.

53 Ibid.

54 Simavoryan Arestakes, Atoyán Vardan, and Simavoryan Sose, "Role of Turkish Think Tanks in the State-Diaspora Relations: The Case of SETA and ORSAM," *Вестник Армянского Государственного Экономического Университета*, no. 5 (2021): 145.

55 Ibid.

56 "SETA 2022 Bahar Dönemi Kurs/Staj Programı Başlıyor," SETA, ubat 2022, <https://www.setav.org/tag/seta-staj-programi/>.

57 Yunus Turhan and Şerif Onur Bahçecik, "The Agency of Faith-Based NGOs in Turkish Humanitarian Aid Policy and Practice," *Turkish Studies* 22, no. 1 (2021): 149.

58 Aydın, "The German Turkey Migration Corridor."

diaspora policies. For example, some Turkey-based NGOs such as Refugee Rights Turkey (Mülteci Hakları Merkezi) have published programmatic research and presented findings to policymakers about the Turkish diaspora in Germany in conjunction with German NGOs and think tanks.⁵⁹ The Turkish Community in Germany (TGD) is another Germany-based NGO with strong affiliations with the Turkish community and Turkish NGOs.⁶⁰ This organization regularly participates in policy dialogues with local governments to present research and advocate for more flexible diaspora policies in regard to movement as well as a greater focus on the integration of Turkish migrants into German society.⁶¹

7. Conclusions and Further Research

Informal diplomatic actors play prominent roles in the processes of migration diplomacy in the two presented case studies. Between the United States and Mexico, academic think tanks and institutions operate as main actors in the informal diplomatic arena. They are active in creating spaces where dialogue between informal actors as well as formal actors can discuss migration policy and possible solutions. NGOs from both countries have also formed broad multilateral coalitions that inform formal migration policymaking. Labor organizations still play a smaller role in the promotion of labor migration policy that focuses on workers' rights, but their importance has diminished as the migration trends between the two states have shifted over the years. Between Turkey and Germany, migration trends have shifted from mainly labor movements from Turkey to Germany to transversal skilled labor migration as well as a focus on the Turkish diaspora population abroad and the integration of Turkish migrants into their host societies. Both think tanks and NGOs have an active role in promoting certain diasporic and integration policies. Labor organizations instead focus their work to promote policies that advocate for easier labor migration pathways for certain transnational workers.

While this study has been able to identify and define the concept of informal migration diplomacy, there is still extensive research that must be done surrounding this topic. Further research could center on delineating a more comprehensive framework for quantitatively or qualitatively measuring the influence of these actors in the formal policymaking process that builds on already established models. Additionally, while the migratory networks between the United States and Mexico and Turkey and Germany do have certain contextual similarities, there still exists stark differences between the two, including geographic proximity of borders and state political and economic environments.

59 "Anasayfa - Mülteci Hakları Merkezi," accessed May 7, 2022, <https://www.mhd.org.tr/tr/>.

60 Zeynep Sezgin, "Turkish Migrants' Organizations: Promoting Tolerance toward the Diversity of Turkish Migrants in Germany," *International Journal of Sociology* 38, no. 2 (2008): 81.

61 Sezgin, "Turkish Migrants' Organizations", 81.

While this study focused on shared migratory characteristics between the two networks, future research could benefit from analyzing the differences between the two and how these aspects might hinder or promote the influence of informal diplomatic actors in migration policymaking. Adding more case study examples of global migratory networks would also provide further insight into the influence of informal diplomatic actors. By having a better understanding of the actors that shape how a state might engage with migration diplomacy, state leaders and policymakers can be better prepared in wielding the diplomatic tools, procedures, and processes that are most effective in creating and managing these migration networks.

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Heretical Pasts, Heterodox Futures?

The Potential for Schism in Today's Russian Orthodox Church

Luke Dykowski

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has dramatically reasserted itself as a social and political force since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Most notably, this reassertion has entailed close identification with the Russian military and state, and widespread self-identification as 'Orthodox' among the Russian public. However, the following study argues that such Church-state alignment leaves the ROC significantly and particularly vulnerable to schism by linking dissent against the state to dissent against the Church, and drawing persecution and designation as 'heterodoxy' from both institutions. To advance this claim, this paper analyzes the current role of the ROC as a sociological orthodoxy that links faith to the state, scrutinizes historical instances of schism in the ROC, and finds that both the causes of and reactions to such schisms are present, and intensifying, in today's Russia.

1. Introduction

There is significant potential for schism within the modern Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).¹ While the ROC has achieved a remarkable degree of political prominence since the collapse of the Soviet Union, including its close alliance with the Russian military and state, this analysis argues that Russian Orthodox faith has conformed to historical patterns in serving primarily as a form of social identity, rather than of theological guidance, for today's believers. However, diverse factions of these adherents also conform to historical patterns in increasingly perceiving their Orthodox identity as threatened by the ROC's support for the state and its goals. Furthermore, the ROC's unification of its community of believers with the state's political community creates an inherent link between challenging the state and challenging the Church. The numerous, serious grievances of Russian believers against the Russian state make such challenges to Church-state unity probable. This study therefore proposes that these confrontations will result in

¹ This paper will use an institutional definition of the ROC, as outlined by Mitrofanova: The Patriarchate headed by the Primate of Moscow and All Rus (currently, Kirill Gundyayev), and officially represented by "synodal departments and other governing bodies that guide the Church." See Anastasia Mitrofanova, "Russian Ethnic Nationalism and Religion Today," in *The New Russian Nationalism*, eds. Kolstø and Blakkisrud (Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 108.

LUKE DYKOWSKI graduated from the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities in May 2022 with majors in History and Political Science, and minors in French and Applied Economics.

schism as believers reject the Church's state-aligned order in favor of alternative sociopolitical orders, and as the Church and state jointly anathematize and criminalize deviance.

To advance these interrelated claims, this analysis proceeds in four parts. First, it outlines the concepts and existing literature that frame its core arguments. Second, scrutinizes the impacts of the ROC's resurgence on the behaviors of its adherents, and demonstrates that the ROC has had the most pronounced effect on believers' self-identification, rather than on their spiritual ideas or practices. Third, it draws on historical cases to evaluate how Church-state alignment has affected Orthodox self-identification in Russia's past, and explores how heterodoxy provoked by this alignment has been understood by the Church, state, and its practitioners. Fourth and finally, it examines current sources of dissent within the ROC's membership, and Church-state responses to religious deviance. This study finds that these modern criticisms are remarkably similar in their causes and discourses to past schisms, and thus concludes – both on the basis of their own merits and their close replication of historical trends – that the modern ROC is primed for the emergence of heterodox, anti-state factions.

2. Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

Evocative attention has been dedicated to the post-Soviet political and spiritual alignment of the ROC and the Russian state. Adamsky describes the increasing identification of Russia's nuclear arsenal and attendant industries with the ROC, and vice versa. Both parties believe that Russia has “entered into a struggle that has not [just] a physical, but a metaphysical significance” against its adversaries, and have thus resolved to jointly “defend the [Russian] people – one physically and the other morally.”²³ Today, the ROC is vociferous in its support for the state's nuclear industry, repeatedly affirming that Russia needs atomic weapons to “remain a sovereign state,” and refusing to adopt a 2016 statement of the autocephalous Orthodox churches condemning weapons of mass destruction.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, the industry has become unapologetically sacralized – embracing patron saints, routine consecrations of bombers, submarines, and missile tests, and frequent public displays of religiosity among officers and operators which meld modern weapons

2 Kirill (Gundyayev), “Sermon on the 4th Week of Great Lent in the Main Church of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” delivered on April 3, 2022.

3 Dimitry Adamsky, *Nuclear Orthodoxy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019): 41.

4 Kirill (Gundyayev), “Comments Delivered in Sarov,” quoted in Sputnik International, “Russian Needs Nuclear Weapons – Patriarch Kirill,” September 11, 2009.

5 Nicholas Sooy, “The Russian Church Must Work for Disarmament,” *The Berkeley Center*, September 4, 2018.

systems with religious symbolism.⁶⁷ In 2007, Putin equated the role of the two institutions, stating publicly that “traditional religions [Russian Orthodoxy] were as important for Russia’s security as its nuclear shield.”⁶⁸

Kolov uses a structuralist framework to term this alignment “mutual legitimation,” and finds that by constructing and disseminating knowledge about one another’s identity and role, both the ROC and the Russian state endorse each other’s actions in accordance with that constructed identity and role.⁹ This endorsement empowers the state to act within the moral and spiritual framework the ROC has narrated for it, and empowers the ROC to act within the societal and political framework the state has narrated for it. Such mutual legitimation plays out beyond the nuclear industry. Kolov identifies it as guiding interaction between the ROC and the Russian armed forces generally, finding that the ROC legitimates the military’s acquisition of “ultramodern powerful weapons” – alongside its growing use of religious symbols – in the name of national security, while the military supports the spiritual influence of the ROC as necessary to “inspire and maintain ‘greatpowerness.’”¹⁰¹¹

Meanwhile, both Dorman and Bogumi et al. detail the ROC’s replacement of secular organizations in commemorating victims of the Gulag. Bogumi et al. write that, through the erection of crosses and churches at labor camps and mass-execution sites, “Russian Orthodox symbolism has become the dominant visual language of remembrance of the Gulag.”¹² This “transfer of responsibility for commemorative affairs from the state to the Orthodox Church” allows the ROC both to identify itself with Russians’ primary means of reconciling with their traumatic Soviet past, and to identify the bloodshed of that past as a “mass martyrdom upon which the resurgent Church is founded.”¹³¹⁴ Additionally, by framing the purges as cosmic, apostolic tribulations, rather than as ruthless acts of temporal totalitarianism, the ROC further rehabilitates the Soviet past with which

6 “Russian Admiral Patron Saint of Bombers,” United Press International, September 27, 2005.

7 Boris Knorre and Aleksei Zygmunt, “‘Militant Piety’ in 21st-Century Orthodoxy Christianity: Return to Classical Traditions or Formation of a New Theology of War?” *Religions* 11, vol. 2 (2020): 7.

8 Vyacheslav Karpov, “The Social Dynamics of Russia’s Desecularization: A Comparative and Theoretical Perspective,” *Religion, State and Society* 41, no. 3 (2013): 267.

9 Bojidar Kolov, “Main Cathedral of Mutual Legitimation: The Church of the Russian Armed Forces as a Site of Making Power Meaningful,” *Religions* 12, no. 925 (2021): 6.

10 Kirill (Gundyayev), “Speech on the Day of Remembrance and Sorrow at the Main Church of the Russian Armed Forces,” delivered on June 22, 2020.

11 Kolov, 16.

12 Zuzanna Bogumi et al., “Sacred or Secular? The ‘Memorial’ Society, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Contested Commemoration of Soviet Repressions,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 67, no. 9 (2015): 1442.

13 Veronika Dorman, “From the Solovki to Butovo: How the Russian Orthodox Church Appropriates the Memory of the Repressions,” *Laboratorium* 2, no. 3 (2010): 434.

14 Bogumi et al., 1424.

the state justifies its own authoritarianism and dreams of great power status.¹⁵

More obvious are the ROC's clear statements in support of this authoritarianism, which reveal the close identification of Church with state. Addressing protests against the Putin regime in December 2011,¹⁶ Patriarch Kirill declared that the Orthodox "do not go to demonstrations"¹⁷ (which Karpov notes "implied those who do are not really Orthodox"¹⁸) and lamented such democratic movements as paralleling "the confusion, crippling, destruction of the country in the 1990s."¹⁹ In his 2020 sermon consecrating the colossal Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces, Kirill repeatedly evoked the duty of the faithful to "preserve the Fatherland from enemies external and internal."²⁰ Kolov argues that this rhetoric provides a political and spiritual "basis for both the villainization and demonization of all those who oppose the state,"²¹ while Knorre and Zygmunt find that this consecration of state activity disallows "the very question of whether it [is] right or not."²² Shakhanova and Kratochvil's empirical analysis of 223 speeches made from 2004-2017 by Patriarchs Alexiy II and Kirill concludes unequivocally that "the Church has become one of the strongest supporters of the Russian state and its policies, depicting the current rulers of Russia as the protectors of the country from enemies both within and without" – these 'enemies' including liberal democrats, Western moral corrosion, geopolitical rivals and Caucasian secessionists.²³ Kuzio goes so far as to as to bluntly assert, "The Russian Orthodox Church is the de facto state Church in the Russian Federation."²⁴

However, while scholars have repeatedly scrutinized the effects of the Russian Orthodox Church and state's 'mutual legitimation' on the ROC and state themselves, corresponding attention has not been devoted to describing the effect of this 'mutual legitimation' on the political or religious behavior of the Russian people or Orthodox faithful.²⁵ This is striking given the contemporary narrative of the ROC's post-Soviet resurgence, whose supporters cite the consecration of tens of thousands of Russian Orthodox church-

15 Bogumi et al., 1445.

16 "Russian Election: Biggest Protests Since Fall of USSR," BBC, December 10th, 2011.

17 Kirill (Gundyayev), "Sermon on the 3rd Anniversary of His Enthronement at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior," delivered on February 1, 2012.

18 Karpov, 270.

19 Kirill (Gundyayev), sermon, February 1, 2012.

20 Kirill (Gundyayev), speech, June 22, 2020.

21 Kolov, 11.

22 Knorre and Zygmunt, 8.

23 Gazia Shakhanova and Petr Kratochvil, "The Patriotic Turn in Russia: Political Convergence of the Russian Orthodox Church and the State?" *Politics and Religion* 15 (2022): 133-134.

24 Taras Kuzio, *Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War* (New York: Routledge, 2022), 204.

25 Indeed, Kolov asserts that this model "somewhat displaces the conventional dependence on the people as granters of legitimacy," 25

es in the last three decades,²⁶ and ambitious estimates by the ROC that some 70% of the country's population is Orthodox,²⁷ to assert that Russia has reclaimed its historical status as "an Orthodox nation."²⁸ If scholarship accepts that the ROC has aligned itself with the state through mutual legitimation and become an increasingly visible, vocal political actor "exerting a vast influence over Russian society,"²⁹ it follows that analyses should seek to characterize the effects of that influence.

The relative lack of such analyses is in stark contrast to the extensive body of research which attempts to document the impact of Catholic, Protestant, and Evangelical self-identification on civic and social behavior in Europe and the Americas. Parallel studies have examined the public manifestation of private Muslim self-identification across North Africa, Central Asia, and Indonesia as civil Islam or, more broadly, political Islam.³⁰ Moreover, despite the salience of studies on the causes and forms of deviance from established hierarchies and institutions of religious authority³¹ – that is, heterodoxy – scholarship on the propensity for heterodoxy within the modern ROC is practically nonexistent. Indeed, prevailing studies have accepted that the ROC is, as its name states, 'Orthodox,' without examining the sociological implications of its 'orthodoxy.'³²

It is evident that the ROC conforms to the definition of a sociologically 'orthodox' institution formulated by Bordieu and elaborated upon by Berlinerblau. As the temporal representative of a cosmological claim, the ROC is continuously attempting to position itself as doxic in the Bordieuian sense — as a "self-evident and natural order which goes without saying and therefore goes unquestioned."³³ At times, it has asserted such a status as an inherent determinant of the Russian social and political order, but

26 Shakhanova and Kratochvil, 115.

27 John Anderson, *Conservative Christian Politics in Russia and the United States* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 27.

28 Sacred Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, *The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church* (2000): article II, sec. 4.

29 Shakhanova and Kratochvil, 133.

30 See, among numerous others: Alfred Stepan, "Religion, Democracy, and the 'Twin Tolerations,'" *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 4 (2000); Daniel Philpot, "Explaining the Political Ambivalence of Religion," *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 3 (2007); Fawaz A. Gerges, "The Islamist Movement: From Islamic State to Civil Islam?" *Political Science Quarterly* 128, no. 3 (2013); Martin van Bruinessen, "The Governance of Islam in Two Secular Polities: Turkey's Diyanet and Indonesia's Ministry of Religious Affairs," *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 27 (2018); Thomas Heggehammer, "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad," *International Security* 35, no 3 (2011).

31 For example, see Robert Langer and Udo Simon, "The Dynamics of Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy: Dealing with Divergence in Muslim Discourse and Islamic Studies," *Die Welt des Islams* 48, no. 3-4 (2008).

32 This paper will differentiate between 'Orthodox(y)' as a faith and 'orthodox(y)' as a sociological discourse by capitalizing the former and not the latter, as I have here.

33 Bordieu, 164-166.

the historicity of these sweeping claims are easily refuted.³⁴ Moreover, particularly after the Soviet assault on religion, the ROC is clearly forced to contend with the existence of alternative organizing principles, and must therefore occupy itself with “aim[ing], without ever entirely succeeding, at restoring the primal state of innocence of doxa” – that is, with being an orthodoxy.³⁵ The ROC’s post-Soviet stature further satisfies Berlinerblau’s relational definition of a religious orthodoxy as a superordinate political apparatus controlling how knowledge and symbols are produced, articulating and gaining social consent for the imposition of correct forms of belief and praxis, and identifying and managing ‘incorrect’ forms.³⁶

These ‘incorrect’ forms include those which an orthodoxy designates heterodoxies (also called heresies). These heterodoxies-heresies claim “to uphold the [orthodox] group’s values and interests,” but propose “different means to this end...where the group wants no alternative to exist.”³⁷ Religious orthodoxy’s attempts to control these heterodoxies often manifests as violent repression, inquisition, and coercive ‘reconciliation’ because of their perceived threat to orthodoxy. Gramsci posits that the imperative of “religion, or of a particular church” is to “maintain its community of the faithful.”³⁸ However, with respect to the Catholic and Eastern Churches, he recognizes that this was often accomplished through “purely mechanical contact, an external unity based in particular on a cult visually imposing to the crowd.”³⁹ When “popular forces aiming to reform the Church and bring it closer to the people by exalting them” disrupted this community, “the reaction of the Church was often very violent.”⁴⁰ Simmel concludes that this violence was not due to “the difference in dogmatic content of [heterodox] teaching,” but arising from “the instinct for the necessity of group unity.”⁴¹ In this view, when a religion situates the preservation of social unity as its primary goal, “the real object of worship [is] the social group.”⁴² The superordinate authority (the orthodoxy) consequently designates and attacks hetero-

34 Even statements which attest to the ROC’s integral sociopolitical role – for example, in Ivan IV’s 1564 description of his “Russian Kingdom of veritable Orthodoxy, by the will of God,” or in Nicholas I’s delineation of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality” as defining a coherent Russia three centuries later (W. Bruce Lincoln, *Nicholas I* (DeKalb: NIU Press, 1989), 239-241) – state that which should be “self-evident and natural,” and therefore acknowledge the existence of alternative organizing principles.

35 Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 169.

36 Jacques Berlinerblau, “Towards a Sociology of Heresy, Orthodoxy, and Doxa,” *History of Religions* 40, no. 4 (2001): 340.

37 Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Free Press: 1964): 70.

38 Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, eds. Hoare and Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), 651.

39 Gramsci, 735.

40 Ibid.

41 Georg Simmel, “Contribution to the Sociology of Religion,” in *Essays on Religion*, eds. Helle and Neider (Yale University Press, 1997), 114-115.

42 Bryan Turner, *Religion and Social Theory* (London: Sage, 1997), 243.

doxy not because of what alternatives it proposes, but because the mere act of proposing is perceived as shattering the cohesion of orthodoxy.

Such a sociological analysis seems to imply that heterodoxy is almost inherent to religious orthodoxy – that, so long as adherents recognize and propose alternative forms of social organization, orthodoxy will condemn and control them. The task of the following sections is therefore to argue that the effects of the ROC on Orthodox identity, and the alliance of the ROC with the Russian state, create a unique potential for heterodoxy in which challenging the state’s political orthodoxy entails challenging the ROC’s religious orthodoxy. To do so, this analysis will turn to how the ROC’s orthodoxy envisions unity, and how this vision may conflict with those of its current adherents.

3. Unity and Identity in the Russian Orthodox Church

The ROC’s discourse on its own reemergence and role in post-Soviet life positions the Church as a seminal and inherent component of Russian identity.⁴³ In this reading, the Baptism of Rus in 988 under Prince Vladimir is “the greatest event in [Russian] history,” amounting to “the Christening of the entire Russian people” – past, present, and future – and rendering them “indissolubly bound to the history of the Russian state.”⁴⁴ In lifting Rus from pagan barbarism to Christian enlightenment, the Orthodox faith orders assumed an integral role in creating “Russian statehood,” as well as Russia’s “national culture... national ideal and even... language.”⁴⁵ As Anderson aptly summarizes, the implication of this discourse is that without Orthodoxy, and without the ROC to order its praxis, there would be no cultural, political, or spiritual ‘Russia.’⁴⁶

Although contested by historians, ROC’s present narrative is therefore one of historical continuity, in which it has stood as the guide and guardian of Russian identity for over a thousand years.⁴⁷ This was also the light in which the ROC positioned itself at the end of the Soviet period: Orthodoxy could heal 1991’s abandonment of communism and great power status by reconciling Russia with its pre-1917 past. It could justify the independence of the reborn Russian state, and replace the USSR’s globalizing ideology with

43 This is a doxic claim of an orthodoxy.

44 Averky (Taushev), “Baptism.”

45 Kirill (Gundyayev), 1998, quoted in Anderson, *Conservative Christian Politics*, 22.

46 John Anderson, “Dreaming of Christian Nations in the USA and Russia: The Importance of History,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 10, no. 3 (2012): 207.

47 See, for example, Kuzio’s assertion that this is “a historical myth” believed by Russian nationalists and even some Western Scholars, 208.

a “universal mission to save humanity” through true Orthodox faith.⁴⁸

The particular mutual legitimation between the ROC and Russia’s nuclear industry demonstrates implications of this narrative. Both the ROC and Russia’s atomic military-industrial complex emerged bruised and beleaguered from the Soviet Union’s collapse. The former was eviscerated by the exclusion of state atheism, and the latter economically and ideologically imperiled by disarmament and reconciliation with the West.⁴⁹ Adamsky implies that the relationship between these two staggering pariahs began as a marriage of convenience. By attaching itself to Russia’s nuclear shield, the ROC asserted its geopolitical relevance as a defender of the nation’s soul, and recruited as believers those left bewildered and rudderless by the end of communism. Meanwhile, the nuclear industry found in the Church both a public advocate and a connection to the integral role in Russian identity the Church claimed to represent. The institutions’ present connection has also had tangible effects on Russians’ individual identities and conceptions of unity. The routine sacralization discussed earlier now colors the daily life of nuclear operators, while Radii Ilkaev, director of the Russian Federal Nuclear Center, noted in 2016 that the Church provided “a high moral bar” for the industry, without which “progress in defense and nuclear matters is impossible.”⁵⁰

Such pervasive presence and moral guidance, however, exist absent the ROC’s articulation of a clear nuclear theology. The Church has not developed a *jus ad bellum* or *jus in bello* theory that justifies the use of weapons of mass destruction with respect to God’s will or Church ethics.⁵¹ Its effect on adherents within the nuclear industry is not ideational.⁵² Instead, the ROC orders the nuclear operator as both the guardian of the Russian state and of the Russian spiritual community. He has a duty to defend the state and a historically-continuous, unified Orthodox identity. Article II of the ROC’s Basis of the Social Concept illustrates this ordering, emphasizing: “In all times the Church has called upon her children to love their homeland on earth and not to spare their lives to protect it if it were threatened... The patriotism of the Orthodox Christian should be active. It is manifested when he defends his Fatherland against an enemy.”⁵³ The dominant role of the ROC is to position the nuclear operator as a defender of a synonymous Russian state and congregation, rather than to make him an adherent to a particular set of dogmatic

48 Mitrofanova, 112-113.

49 Terence Hunt, “In Disarmament Breakthroughs, Clinton, Yeltsin Sign Nuclear Accords,” Associated Press, January 14, 1994.

50 Quoted in “Leading Russian Nuclear Scientist Says the Orthodox Church Helped Save the Post-Soviet Nuclear Arsenal,” Meduza, August 3, 2016.

51 Adamsky, 217.

52 Consider this in contrast theological criteria circumscribing war in various faiths, as described in Mark Juergensmeyer and Margo Kitts, *Princeton Readings in Religion and Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

53 Sacred Bishops’ Council, *Basis of the Social Concept*, article II, sec. 2-3.

beliefs. He, like Prince Vladimir against the Hungarians and Baltics, Alexander Nevsky against the Swedes, or even (in the revisionist myth) Zhukov against the Nazis, is the latest incarnation of a line of holy warriors protecting the Russian people from foreign menaces. His role is integral to the vitality and sovereignty of Russia and, to that end, was created by divine will, with the hermit St. Seraphim – at whose monastic complex the Soviet atomic and hydrogen bombs were designed – both prophesizing his function and permitting the creation of his wondrous weapon.⁵⁴

Thus, in accordance with Gramsci and Simmel's theories, the ROC situates religion as a form of social identity which fosters unity, rather than a set of spiritual concepts. It prescribes certain communal rituals which help individuals "make sense... of what they share with, and how they differ, from others,"⁵⁵ rather than creating a doctrine on nuclear purpose or usage. Reinforcing "harmonic unity" between adherents through common self-identification as Orthodox is emphasized ahead of liturgical observances or catechizations.⁵⁶ To borrow Holt's phrasing, the sociological function of the ROC within the nuclear industry is to define a "body of believers" with a duty to both Church and state, rather than a "body of beliefs" which recognizes only a religious orthodoxy.⁵⁷

This is not only congruent with theory, but with Orthodoxy's pre-Soviet function as a framework of "collective belonging, collective ethos, and a communal ethos"⁵⁸ – one whose primary role was the orderly relation of individuals to their society, and that collective society to the divine. Moreover, this is the dominant effect of the ROC's resurgence in today's Russia, well beyond the nuclear industry. Although accurate data have become increasingly scarce, analyses from the first two decades of the 21st century indicate that Russia's 'desecularization'⁵⁹ has promoted broad Orthodox identification and circumscribed a post-Soviet body of believers, without fostering corresponding ritual behavior or spiritual education. While ROC, state, and public discourse equate being Russian with being Orthodox,⁶⁰ Anderson and Karpov agree that Russia's religious landscape remains defined by negligible church participation and pervasive disconnect between self-affiliation and actual acceptance of religious dogma.⁶¹ This assessment is supported by survey data

54 Adamsky, 157. See also Egor Kholmogorov, "Atomic Orthodoxy," lecture at Sarov, August 31, 2008.

55 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity,'" *Theory and Society* 29, no. 1 (2000):

56 Natalia Naydenova, "Holy Rus: (Re)construction of Russia's Civilizational Identity," *Slavonica* 21, no. 1-2 (2016): 41.

57 Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629: Second Edition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 2.

58 Julie McBrien, *From Belonging to Belief: Modern Secularisms and the Construction of Religion in Kyrgyzstan* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017): 18.

59 Karpov, 255.

60 Anderson, *Conservative Christian Politics*, 207. See also Mitrofanova, 114; Averkoy (Taushev), "Baptism"; Tobias Kollner, "Patriotism, Orthodox Religion and Education: Empirical Findings from Contemporary Russia," *Religion, State and Society* 44, no. 4: 381.

61 Karpov, 259; Anderson, "Dreaming," 205.

collected by the Levada Centre in the first decade of the 21st century.⁶² When questioned about beliefs and practices incongruent with the stances of the ROC (and other religious institutions), respondents revealed prevalent faith in supernatural forces not comprehended by the ROC. The share of respondents who affirmed that “Jesus Christ really was the son of God,” 53%, was identical to the share who believed in magic and within 10% of the share who believed in the power of Zodiac signs, ghosts, luck, and telepathy.⁶³ The study therefore concluded that “esoteric worldviews are common in Russian society”⁶⁴ – and confirmed Karpov’s diagnosis that, while “it is easy to build and ideologically enforce a sense of a nationwide imagined Russian Orthodox Church,” such an image does not entail the existence of a doctrinally-minded, ritually-participant society.⁶⁵ Anderson’s report that, even as some ROC leaders claim a staggering 80% of the population has been baptized, less than 5% of Russians regularly attend church, and “very few [have] any coherent theological understanding of the [Orthodox] faith,” affirms this view.⁶⁶

The ROC itself has cited “the communal dimension of Russian religiosity” as explaining this discrepancy between weak religious praxis and their claim that Russia is an Orthodox nation.⁶⁷ Thus, both data and the ROC’s narrative conform with the sociological model of a religious orthodoxy in concurring that, instead of reforming individual belief and behavior, the Church’s resurgence has encouraged individuals’ self-identification as ‘Orthodox.’ The ROC prioritizes the notion of a Russian community of believers and, through the aforementioned process of mutual legitimation discussed earlier, asserts that the principal purpose of the faithful is fulfilling God’s commandments through patriotism.⁶⁸ It calls on the faithful to exemplify “discipline, motivation, the fulfillment of patriotic duty, and service to a higher cause,” vows to “remain loyal to the state,”⁶⁹ and demands defense of the state ahead of demanding adherence to a set of beliefs.⁷⁰ Therefore, the unity envisioned by the ROC’s orthodoxy is unity within a strong Russian state — religious

62 Demyan Belyaev, “Heterodox Religiousness’ in Today’s Russia: Results of an Empirical Study,” *Social Compass* 58, no.3 (2011): 353.

63 Belyaev, 359.

64 Belyaev, 358.

65 Karpov, 259-60.

66 Anderson, *Conservative Christian Politics*, 27; 39.

67 Anderson, “Dreaming,” 205.

68 See Metropolitan Kirill, 2008, quoted in Karpov, 270: “Precisely the love of the fatherland is the fulfillment of God’s commandment to love one’s neighbor.” See also Shakhanova and Kratochvil, 131.

69 Sacred Bishops’ Council, *Basis of the Social Concept*, article III, sec. 5.

70 Shakhanova and Kratochvil, 132.

unity whose “faith, prayer, and spirit are all harnessed to strengthen national security.”⁷¹

This concept of unity places the ROC in a precarious position. As the following sections argue, it is precisely such an alignment of Church and state that has historically inspired “competing possibles”⁷² which the ROC’s orthodoxy rejects as heterodoxy and heresy. By examining several past instances of heterodoxy, this study will assess why this alignment has provoked dissent, and how the Church and state have responded to such dissent, before relating this assessment to present conditions in the ROC.

4. Historical Patterns of Heterodoxy within the Russian Body of Believers

The modern relationship between the ROC and Russian state is not a novel condition. While the ROC’s orthodox discourse strives towards a doxic unity of Church and state, it is true that both institutions have been historically characterized by their close spiritual and political relationship. This alliance is rooted in the Byzantine concept of *symphonia*, in which the overlapping authority of emperor and patriarch created “a kind of symphonic duet... the primary function of which [was] to preserve order and maintain harmony in imitation of the divine order of heaven.”⁷³ After the fall of Constantinople, Russia’s rulers and Church began understanding themselves as the heirs to this legacy of *symphonia*, and as responsible for protecting the whole of true Christendom as the “third Rome.”⁷⁴ This development coincided with the increasing political strength of the Grand Princes of Moscow, aiding their transformation into sacralized autocrats (tsars) and culminating in Peter I’s Holy Synod, which directly submitted the Moscow Patriarchate to imperial authority from 1721-1917.⁷⁵

However, this historical alliance of the ROC’s religious orthodoxy and the political orthodoxy of the tsardom has not been uncontested. As the following cases demonstrate, the very mutual legitimation of Church-state authorities which the ROC pursues

71 Kolov, 10; see also Karpov, 262; Shakhanova and Kratochvil, 128.

72 Bordieu, 169.

73 Deno Geanakoplos, “Church and State in the Byzantine Empire: A Reconsideration of the Problem of Caesaropapism,” *Church History* 34, no. 4 (1965): 382. Note that the ROC has openly aspired to this *symphonia*: see “Priests About the Symphony of the State and the Church,” *Regions.ru*, April 2, 2009.

74 Paul Dukes, *A History of Russia: c. 882-1996* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 58-59.

75 Bushkovitch, *Peter the Great* (London: Rowan & Littlefield, 2016), 130.

today has provoked some of Russia's most notable and enduring cases of heterodoxy.

4.1. *The Old Believers*

The reforms of the Russian Orthodox liturgy undertaken by the Patriarch Nikon and the Tsar Alexey beginning in 1653,⁷⁶ and confirmed by a Church council in 1666-1667,⁷⁷ marked a key inflection point in the process of imperial Church-state alignment. It also ignited the most prolific and enduring instance of Russian heterodoxy: that of the 'Old Believers.' The Nikonian reforms included alterations to the sign of the cross, changes in the number of times "Alleluia" was said during liturgical hymns, the relaxation of bowing requirements or prohibitions during the liturgy, and increasing emphasis on the tsar and the imperial family, rather than the congregation, during liturgical prayer⁷⁸ – with the goal of bringing Russian Orthodoxy into closer alignment with Greek Orthodoxy and, thus, the tradition of Byzantine symphonia.⁷⁹ Although such adjustments may seem trivial to modern readers, it was the Old Believers' refusal to adopt them, and their insistence on retaining the "old" (pre-Nikonian) rites that prompted their raskol (schism) from the ROC and their violent persecution until 1905.

Analyses of the raskol clearly situate it as a rupture in Orthodox identity and unity, consistent with the frameworks of Gramsci, Simmel, and Berlinerblau. Robson argues that Nikonian reforms constituted a "blasphemous overturning and destruction of God's world order" in the eyes of many parishioners – one that represented more than simple changes to the structure of the liturgy, but revisions in the community's relationship to itself and the divine.⁸⁰ Contemporary clerics likened the liturgy to the product of an engineer's labor: just as an engineer "finds a system – a ritual – to finish his work efficiently and correctly,"⁸¹ so too had the early Church fathers worked diligently to construct a liturgy that would allow a congregation to commune with the divine "efficiently and correctly." Altering this system thus ran counter to the holy wisdom of its original architects, and prevented the body of believers from participating in uniform, effective Orthodox worship.

The issue of ritual bowing illustrates this point. The Nikonian reforms eliminated some conventional instances of liturgical bowing (for example, when entering the church) but

76 Alesksandra Sulikowska-Belczowska, "The Cult of Old Believers' Domestic Icons and the Beginning of Old Belief in Russia in the 17th-18th Centuries," *Religions* 10, no. 574 (2019): 3.

77 Maureen Perrie, "The Old Believers and Praying for the Tsar in Seventeenth-Century Russia," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 94, no. 2 (2016): 244.

78 Roy R. Robson, "Liturgy and Community among Old Believers, 1905-1917," *Slavic Review* 52, no. 4 (1993): 720-23.

79 Dukes, 80-81.

80 Robson, 713; 716.

81 Robson, 717.

relaxed strict prohibitions on individual, spontaneous bowing or genuflection during the service itself. To the Old Believers, the congregation's uniform bowing marked a "passage from secular to sacred space and time" for the entire community that reform de-emphasized and disorganized, while additional, individual bows "only served to disrupt the communal harmony of divine services."⁸² Reform therefore disrupted more than routine – it was a deviance which "mutilated"⁸³ the plan of the liturgical engineers and shattered the disciplined unity of the congregation, threatening to distance the social body from God.

Similar concerns surrounded the Nikonian changes to prayers in which the priest addressed the congregation immediately before communion. In pre-reform services, the priest called upon God to remember the assembled congregation, and upon the congregation to remember God. However, post-1667, the Church mandated that the priest first call upon God to remember the ruling tsar, extended royal family, and Church hierarchs, before finally invoking the general laity. In this formulation, "the faithful were relegated to last place" – with those physically present superseded in spiritual importance by a distant state authority who, at this juncture, had yet to acquire a widely-accepted sacral importance.⁸⁴ The body of believers felt excluded from their liturgical relationship with God, imperiling their communal Orthodox identity. Avvakum, archpriest of Moscow's Kazan Cathedral and among the most prolific critics of Nikon, condemned the reformed prayers of the Great Entry precisely because they entailed an improper sanctification of the state at the expense of the broader community. In "not only introducing an additional commemoration of the tsar, and naming him, but also using fulsome adjectives of praise and describing him as 'holy,'"⁸⁵ Avvakum found the Nikonian system guilty of giving temporal authority a fabricated sacral power that alienated the faithful.

In some parts of Russia, opposition to these prayers for the tsar manifested in outright insurrection. At the Solovetskii Monastery, significant segments of the clergy continued to insist on pre-reform liturgies; the complex was later besieged by Alexey for its refusal to comply with the Nikonian changes.⁸⁶ Such resistance was hardly confined to the clergy. In 1669, reports from the local military commander complained that the omission of prayers to tsar health was common in the White Sea district, while in and around Moscow, the streltsy – Ivan IV's gendarmes – revolted against the reforms several times.⁸⁷ Meanwhile, on Russia's southern frontier, the Don Cossacks welcomed fugitive Old Be-

82 Robson, 721-723.

83 Avvakum (Petrov), *The Life of the Archpriest Avvakum by Himself*, trans. Jane Harrison and Hope Mirrlees (London: The Hogarth Press, 1924), 37.

84 Robson, 720-23.

85 Perrie, "Praying," 249.

86 Dukes, 82.

87 Dukes, 81.

liever priests into their communities and demanded that they “use the old [pre-Nikonian] service-book exactly as it was printed” – threatening to kill anyone who prayed for the tsars.⁸⁸

Such examples both illustrate the seriousness of these issues in the raskol and demonstrate the degree to which their opposition to the Nikonian reforms was “a comment on the social organization preferred by the Old Believers.”⁸⁹ The prayers and bows, completed in perfect unison by the pre-Nikonian congregation and with a distinct emphasis on the physically-present community, were structured to unify that community with itself and with the divine. In contrast, reforms’ tsarist distractions and desynchronizations imperiled these relationships, and allowed state authority to intrude upon communal identification. The Old Believers rejected reforms that “elevated external political and spiritual authority over the community,”⁹⁰ and which moved the liturgy towards the “purely mechanical contact” described by Gramsci.⁹¹ This elevation also set a dangerous precedent. If the tsar’s rule could intrude into the sacred realm of the liturgy, on what grounds could the Church resist attempts by the papacy or the sacral monarchies of Western Europe to influence its functions? For the Old Believers, Nikon had opened the door to “increasingly modern and foreign notions” of state-Church alignment infiltrating the Orthodox faith.⁹²

With both of their orthodoxies opposed, the Church and the tsar responded violently.⁹³ Anathematized by the Church in 1666,⁹⁴ many Old Believers fled Russia. Those who did not were imprisoned, exiled to Siberia, or executed. Revolts were brutally suppressed, and Avvakum himself was burned at the stake for heresy in 1682.⁹⁵ As a product of their opposition to tsarist-Nikonian authority and these brutal persecutions, the Old Believers developed a virulent anti-state discourse and eschatology. To them, the liturgical changes which divorced Russia from the divine and which permitted the intrusion of the temporal into the spiritual left the world “overturned by blasphemy and mockery of the holy rites,” and left the Russian state and Church squarely under the Antichrist’s control.⁹⁶ Numerous portents, including solar eclipses and epidemic outbreaks in Moscow, “[made]

88 Perrie, “Praying,” 247; 253.

89 Robson, 724.

90 Robson 721.

91 Gramsci, 735.

92 Robson, 716.

93 Sulikowska-Belczowska, “Cult,” 9.

94 Maureen Perrie, “Moscow in 1666: New Jerusalem, Third Rome, Third Apostasy,” *Quaestio Rossica*, no. 3 (2014): 75.

95 Bushkovitch, 64.

96 Aleksandra Sulikowska-Belczowska, “Old Believers and the World of Evil: Images of Evil Forces in Old Believer Art,” *Ikonothea* 27, no. 1 (2017): 71-73.

known the wrath of God⁹⁷ and confirmed that the End of Days had arrived – ushered in by the machinations of the patriarch and the tsar who hunted the righteous for their determination to retain their unreformed, untainted, united faith.⁹⁸ Persecuted by both Church and state, and living (in their understanding) through Creation’s last days, many Old Believers turned to despair and self-destruction. At the urging of Avvakum,⁹⁹ some 20,000 Old Believers burned themselves to death between 1675 and 1695,¹⁰⁰ often inside prayer houses and alongside their families, congregations, and holy icons.¹⁰¹

For the two centuries following the raskol, the Church’s efforts to reconcile with the Old Believers were halting. Hundreds of thousands of Old Believers had fled the empire, and Elizabeth I, Peter III, and Catherine II all attempted to induce them to resettle Russia’s southern frontier.¹⁰² Most significant of these attempts was the short-lived policy of *edinoverie* (‘one faith’) prescribed by the Holy Synod in 1763. Reasoning that the use of the old rites was not, in and of itself, anathema, the Synod permitted Old Believers to use their pre-Nikonian liturgy, so long as they acknowledged the “fundamentals of Orthodoxy” and accepted the Synodally-appointed priests.¹⁰³ Later accommodations enabled Old Believer congregations to elect their own clergymen – an autonomy which, to some degree, relaxed the “secular government interference” in communal identity which had provoked the initial schism.¹⁰⁴ However, this policy had distinct limits: proposals to ordain an Old Believer bishop were repeatedly denied on the grounds that Old Believers, even when reconciled, were too prone to disloyalty to the state and might proselytize to the Nikonian Orthodox.¹⁰⁵¹⁰⁶ By the reign of Nicholas I, the policy’s success in closing the southern frontier and abject failure to convert Old Believers, who resented the policy’s assiduous denial of “full legitimization and political rehabilitation,”¹⁰⁷ encouraged a steady erosion of *edinoverie* and legal protections for Old Belief, ultimately relapsing into out-

97 Avvakum (Petrov), 37.

98 Sulikowska-Belczowska, “Evil,” 88.

99 Avvakum (Petrov), 22.

100 Dukes, 81-82.

101 Sulikowska-Belczowska, “Evil,” 75.

102 I. I. Vernaiev, “The Russian Policy of Estate, Civil, and Confessional Integration of the Supporters of ‘Old Belief,’” *Russian History* 44, no. 1 (2017).

103 Vernaiev, 125-126.

104 Alexander Palkin and James White, “Clerical Outsiders: The *Edinoverie* Priesthood in Imperial Russia, 1800-1917,” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 72, no. 2 (April 2021): 375

105 Vernaiev, 127-128.

106 Palkin and White, 376.

107 *Ibid.*

right persecution.¹⁰⁸

Thus, two important characteristics of Russia's greatest strand of heterodoxy may be identified in this survey of the Old Belief. First, the raskol was triggered by disputes about reform's social and spiritual implications for congregational relationships; that is, for religion as a unified body of believers and their position vis à vis the state. Old Believers contended that the Nikonian changes to the form of the liturgy corrupted a ritual engineered to ensure harmony within the community, and to ensure that community's harmony with the divine. Meanwhile, names and offices invoked in reformed prayers sacralized the imperial and Church hierarchies, and reflected an actual drive to extend state control over communities of faith. The violent reaction of the Church and state and the refusal of the Synod to create a politically-independent Old Belief episcopate, even at the height of *edinoverie*, demonstrate that the Russian state and Church also understood the Old Believers in Simmel's terms: as a group whose social, rather than dogmatic, deviance was its chief offense.

Second, this schism of a body of believers from state and Church authority created a destructive, eschatological, anti-state sentiment among the heterodox. The Old Believers' emphatic rejection of the tsar's spiritual authority, especially in prayer, demonstrated a widespread refusal to accept the sacralization of the state and its intrusion into the spiritual life of the community. Their refusal manifested both in maintenance of pre-reform rituals and in a belief that the tsar and the patriarch had embraced a "new communion of the Antichrist,"¹⁰⁹ heralding the impending Apocalypse. Faced with such calamities, the Old Believers did not shy away from self-destruction. Confident that their maintenance of true faith placed them among "the chosen righteous who would be granted eternal life," they turned to violent state resistance and suicidal self-immolation.¹¹⁰

4.2. *Minor Heterodox Strands: Dukhobors, Pashkovites*

It is worth noting that these two characteristics are also present, at least in part, in other, less-significant forms of Russian heterodoxy. Among the Dukhobors, for example, we see the re-emergence of distinct anti-state sentiment and near-obsessive eschatology. The group, which emerged around the southern city of Tambov in the 1760s, "rejected the priests, sacraments, and icons of the Church" and instead "venerated one another,"¹¹¹ bowing to the spirit of God which existed in each individual.¹¹² So too did they reject even

108 Vernaiev, 132.

109 Avvakum (Petrov), 116-117.

110 Sulikowska-Belczowska, "Evil," 91.

111 Eugene Clay, "Russian Spiritual Christianity and the Closing of the Black-Earth Frontier: The First Heresy Trials of the Dukhobors in the 1760s," *Russian History* 40, no. 2 (2013): 228.

112 Kenneth Peacock, *Songs of the Doukhobors* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970): 7

the Bible, viewing it as an obstacle “on the road of truth.”¹¹³ These rejections escalated into shocking, public repudiations of the Church – for example, screaming obscenities during the Easter Vigil, a blasphemous crime punishable by death.¹¹⁴ Such outbursts were prompted by a “radical eschatology that predicted the imminent return of Christ”: with the Apocalypse palpably near, the Dukhobors believed persecution for their open worship and break with the Church would be swiftly ended by the Second Coming.¹¹⁵ Their hymns, sung with a combination of eager anticipation and “bitter tears,” celebrated the arrival of a vengeful God who would overthrow the tsar and patriarch, laying waste to Russia and the world at large.¹¹⁶

The Church and state had little patience for congregations who so flagrantly refuted their intertwined orthodoxy. Dukhobor in the Tambov region were arrested and flogged for fomenting rebellion in 1768; the Synod ordered their conscription en masse in 1769 and deported numerous communities to Siberia in the following decades, having decided that their heterodoxy was too dangerous to be tolerated.¹¹⁷¹¹⁸

A significant contributing factor to this intolerance was the pervasive view that the Dukhobors’ beliefs were the products of foreign influence. The state condemned them as ‘Quakers,’ a term used broadly in Russia to describe any form of ‘spiritual Christianity’ suspected of entering from the West. State authorities cited a legend attributing Dukhobor faith to a Western, Quaker military retiree who had arrived in Tambov around 1740.¹¹⁹ While this theory has been decisively refuted by both modern research and contemporary evidence that Dukhobor practices were likely derived from extreme iconoclasts among the Old Believers, its assertion of subversive foreign influence echoes both the Synod’s accusations of disloyalty against the Old Believers at the close of edinoverie, as well as the Old Believers’ fears about external contamination of their own religious identity.¹²⁰

This theory also presaged the state’s repression of the Pashkovites, a network of Orthodox converts to Baptist denominations led by members of the capitalist aristocracy, in the late 19th century.¹²¹ Drawing on German Protestantism, the Pashkovites abandoned

113 Nick Mukortoft Choir of Dukhobor Elders, “A Young Man Was Walking / PEA 276-1681,” trans. Eli A. Popoff, recorded July 21, 1963. See also Peacock, 59-60.

114 Clay, 233.

115 Clay, 228; 232.

116 See the hymn quoted in Clay, 233-234.

117 Clay, 241.

118 Peacock, 7-12.

119 Clay, 226.

120 Maria Kolesnikova, “Spirit Wrestlers of Southern Russia,” *Russian Life* 48, no. 5 (2005): 35. See also Peacock at 60.

121 A. Iu. Polunov, “The State and Religious Heterodoxy in Russia (from 1880 to the Beginning of the 1890s),” *Russian Studies in History* 39, no. 4 (2001): 55.

their Orthodoxy in favor of an anti-Church (and increasingly anti-tsarist) stance, rejecting “hierarchy, church organization and the worship of icons” and recognizing the Bible “as the sole authority” on spiritual matters.¹²² Almost immediately, Church hierarchs “equated [Pashkovite] heterodoxy with betrayal of the state and the nation and regarded it as a threat to the social order,”¹²³ blaming its spread on sinister “foreign persons...acting as enemies of the Orthodox Church.”¹²⁴ The state responded by exiling Pashkovite leadership and closing Pashkovite presses, while the clergy demanded complete legal exclusion of Protestants from public life.¹²⁵ Such a response was demanded by the heterodoxy’s perceived promulgation of external, anti-orthodox influences.

In addition to reinforcing the characteristics of Russian heterodoxy exemplified by the Old Believers, cases such as those of the Dukhobors and the Pashkovites help identify a significant characteristic of the discourse surrounding Russian heterodoxy: that it describes heterodoxy as either a product of or a resistance to foreign interference. For the Dukhobors and Pashkovites, heterodoxy was inseparable from accusations of externally-fomented disloyalty to the Russian Church and state; for the Old Believers, Nikonian abandonment of the old rites was an invitation to this same subversive influence. Thus, for both the heterodox and orthodox, deviation from ‘true faith’ is representative of dangerous, un-Russian influences on Russian institutions and spirituality.

5. Familiar Fractures in the Modern Russian Orthodox Church

Analysis of the cases cited above allows us to draw three conclusions about historical Russian heterodoxy: first, that it was a reaction to Church-state alignment and encroachment on communities of believers; second, that the Church and state jointly punished and condemned it as foreign; and third, that it consequently assumed an anti-state (and occasionally eschatological) character. The first of these conclusions can be regarded as source of heterodoxy, the second as a Church-state reaction to its repudiation of authority, and third as a heterodox reaction to persecution.

This analysis has already argued that the primary function of the ROC continues to be the creation of a unified religious identity, and discussed its growing proximity to the Russian state. Examining current trends in ROC discourse and policies reveals further replication of all three of these historical patterns of heterodox conflict, which leaves the

122 Polunov, 55.

123 Polunov, 56.

124 Bishop Nikanor of Kherson, 1884, quoted in Polunov, 57.

125 Polunov, 58; 63.

modern ROC primed for the emergence of deviant sects.

5.1. Church-State Alignment and Encroachment

The discursive and political alignment of the ROC and the post-Soviet Russian state has been well-documented, both within and beyond this paper. The result of these institutions' mutual legitimation has been the overt union of state objectives and Church rhetoric on issues of national security and antidemocratic impulses. However, despite its widespread Orthodox self-identification, it is incorrect to assume that Russian society – or even certain elements of the Russian clergy – have blithely swallowed the narrative that the ROC's principal purpose is creating a unified Russian state.¹²⁶ This assertion is counter to the Orthodox self-identification of several segments of Russian society.

On one hand, the ROC's dependence on the Russian state for legitimization has eroded the idea that the Church can exist beyond the political authority of the state. This forfeits a tenet which Mitrofanova identified as essential to the ROC as recently as 2016: that, as the guardian of a messianic Christian faith, the Church has a global mission which “does not promote nationalistic concepts – neither ethnic, nor imperial, nor civilizational,” and which it has a responsibility to carry out beyond the Russian state and cultural world.¹²⁷ If, as Stoeckl argues, the ROC has chosen to define itself as a national church “at least for the near and mid-term future,”¹²⁸ we should expect those who oppose reducing their universalizing claim to a mere “ideological support” for the Russian state to increasingly reject identification with the ROC.¹²⁹

Conversely, there are members of the Church who believe the ROC has not gone far enough in asserting itself, not only as a nationalist faith, but an ethnonationalist faith. To these Orthodox ethnonationalists, the present world is in the thrall of the Antichrist, and it is only “the Russian people and [...] specifically a state of the Russian people” (emphasis added) who are the katechon (the spiritual withholder of the End Times) preventing his apocalyptic reign.¹³⁰ They hold that it is neither possible nor desirable to maintain a Russian Federation which unites different racial and ethnic groups. Accordingly, they decry the ROC's failure to deliberately limit its mission to an ethnically Russian body of believers, as well as its support for the Federation's ruling regime. Such accusations mirror the Old Believers' arguments that the Nikonian reforms imperiled their uniquely Russian

126 Kolov, 15.

127 Mitrofanova, 112-113.

128 Kristina Stoeckl, “The End of Post-Soviet Religion,” *Orthodox Christian Studies Center*, July 20th, 2020.

129 Mitrofanova, 109.

130 Mitrofanova, 113.

community of believers by paving the way for papal and other non-Russian interferences.

Similarly dissatisfied are those broadly termed ‘Orthodox fundamentalists,’ who share ethnonationalists’ anger at the ROC for endorsing the Russian Federation. Turcescu and Mitrofanova describe these believers as avowedly monarchist.¹³¹ They thus oppose the present ruling regime which, no matter its authoritarianism, is hardly the autocracy of House Romanov. With their own inclination towards eschatology, some fundamentalists hold that the murdered Tsar Nicholas II was himself the katechon, whose death was a Christ-like atonement for a sinful Russian nation.¹³² Moreover, they maintain that Russia is destined to receive a new, Antichrist-conquering tsar, and have bordered on calling for the radical overthrow of the present state in agitating for his return.¹³³¹³⁴

Both Orthodox ethnonationalists and fundamentalists echo the virulent anti-state sentiment of historical Russian heterodoxies in contending that, by identifying itself with the Federation, the modern ROC has sacrificed the integrity of the Orthodox community of believers and thereby a basic component of Orthodox identity. Mitrofanova diagnoses not only laypeople, but the ordained Church clergymen who fall into these camps, as “bordering on schism” from the ROC.¹³⁵ As the ROC draws itself ever closer to the state, it is becoming impossible for those who believe that Orthodoxy is, at its core, monarchist or ethnically exclusivist to remain in communion with the ROC. The propensity for schism is therefore high among these groups.

Moreover, despite its ethnic and imperial grounds, the central (and historically familiar) claim of these groups – that the ROC has forfeited its legitimacy due to its alignment with the state – could provoke heterodoxy among much broader swathes of Russian society. Just as the Old Believers opposed the tsar’s encroachment on their spiritual and political independence, the Church’s unrepentant support for the state – itself increasingly indistinguishable from the Putin regime – may begin to disillusion those faithful who question the regime’s repressive policies. Intentionally linked to Vladimir Vladimirovich, the Church now embodies a variety of threats to Russians’ independence, integrity, and identities: for the religiously-participant, to their desire for transcendent, “spiritual-moral development;”¹³⁶ for the pro-democratic, to the establishment of free and fair civic and political institutions; for the military and its industries, to their professionalism and

131 Lucian Turcescu, “Eastern Orthodox Constructions of ‘the West’ in Post-Communist Political Discourse: The Cases of the Romanian and Russian Orthodox Churches,” *Orthodox Constructions of the West*, eds. Demacopoulos and Papanikolaou (Fordham University Press, 2013), 225; Mitrofanova, 114.

132 Victor Schnirelman, “To Take the Katechon Out of the Milieu,” *Antisemitism Studies* 4, no. 2 (2020): 328.

133 Mitrofanova, 114.

134 Turcescu, 225.

135 Mitrofanova, 119. Karpov agrees that the current ROC is vulnerable to incursion from “alternative Orthodox groups,” 278.

136 General Iurri Plotnikov, 2010, quoted in Adamsky, 55.

responsibility to the national interest, ahead of the whims of the ruling class.¹³⁷ As the ROC's brazen support for undemocratic, repressive initiatives becomes increasingly apparent via its defense of regime priorities, including the disastrous invasion of Ukraine, the Church will surrender its claims to both spiritual and political authority.¹³⁸¹³⁹ "Stand[ing] on... the side of God's truth, on the side of the Divine commandments,"¹⁴⁰ as Patriarch Kirill urged the faithful to do in a March 2022 sermon praising the Donbass separatists, now entails standing on the side of senseless warmongering, isolationism, and corruption – which Russians are proving increasingly unwilling to do.¹⁴¹ Self-identification with the ROC increasingly demands social, political, and spiritual subordination to Putin, nationalism, and authoritarianism – a demand which may prompt repudiation of the Church.

It is the familiar union of the Church and state which leaves the ROC exposed to both spiritual and political dissent. In establishing orthodoxy as "identification... with national interest, rather than with interests that are purely theological," mutual legitimation has created a double vulnerability for the ROC.¹⁴² It ensures that political discontent – whether motivated by economic shortfalls, rigged elections, or ill-fated military expansionism – must entail religious discontent. To criticize the state is to criticize the Church, and vice versa. This brings a broad range of citizens who might otherwise passively accept self-identification as 'Orthodox' into potential conflict with the ROC over issues which have no inherent link to faith.

5.2. Church-State Condemnation and Persecution, and Escalation to Anti-State Heterodoxy

A historical trigger for heterodoxy – Church-state alignment and encroachment – is thus present in contemporary Russia, and so too are historical patterns of Church-state reactions to deviance. For the Old Believers, Dukhobors, and Pashkovites, rejecting the ROC's authority and defining alternative communities of believers elicited persecution

137 Anton Troianovski and Michael Schwartz, "As Russia Stalls in Ukraine, Dissent Brews Over Putin's Leadership," *The New York Times*, March 22, 2022.

138 Kirill (Gundyayev), sermon, April 3, 2022: wherein the Patriarch openly asserted Russian dominion over the Ukrainian state and people, stating: "I do not cease to feel anxiety for all the people who live in those places where military clashes are taking place today. After all, these are the peoples of Holy Rus." This is the idealized Russian polity which "God made... 'holy' and gave... a special and exclusive mission among other nations," see M.D. Suslov, "'Holy Rus': The Geopolitical Imagination in the Contemporary Russian Orthodox Church," *Russian Politics and Law* 52, no. 3 (May-June 2014): 71.

139 Karpov, 274

140 Kirill (Gundyayev), "Patriarchal Sermon on Cheesefare Week after the Liturgy at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior," delivered on March 6, 2022.

141 Alec Dubro, "Just Say Nyet: Russia Races Dissent in the Military," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, September 6, 2022. <https://fpif.org/just-say-nyet-russia-faces-dissent-in-the-military/>.

142 Anna Grzymata-Busse, *Nations Under God* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015): 8.

by both the Church and state. For the latter two groups, this persecution was accelerated by accusations that the heterodox were agents of treacherous foreign influences. Today, the state has once again begun to take an active role in repressing action the ROC perceives as undermining Church sanctity and authority. 2013 amendments to the federal legal code which criminalize insulting vaguely-defined “religious feelings” – nominally to prevent provocations to violence¹⁴³ – have been used to imprison protestors and vloggers accused by the ROC of provoking “blasphemy and outrage.”¹⁴⁴ This is not simply an illustration of the ROC’s reactionism, but rather a blending of ecclesiastic and state jurisdictions which presages similar treatment of the heterodox. It resurrects the capacity to punish religious offenders “through state security, defense, and law enforcement agencies” which the Church enjoyed when it could rely on imperial force to crush and exclude ‘schismatics.’¹⁴⁵

Furthermore, the ROC and state have both revived historical accusations that the heterodox are alien and disloyal to both institutions. Beginning in the 1990s, activist clergy and congregation members blacklisted religious “sects” for the ROC to then rhetorically attack. “Foreignness and alleged harmfulness” to Russian society were the “key criteria for inclusion” on these lists.¹⁴⁶ The dozens of identified groups, as well as those designated by the ROC as “New Religious Organizations of Destructive and Occult Character,” included Hare Krishnas, Baha’ites, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and numerous Protestant affiliations. Church targeting of these alleged ‘sectarians’ is not limited to non-Russian missionaries; it includes Orthodox converts to these denominations and their organic communities, some of whom have existed in Russia since the 19th century.¹⁴⁷ Vigilante violence against these denominations, often aggravated by the ROC’s “aggressive hostility” towards them,¹⁴⁸ has been coupled with judicial repression. Laws framed as “anti-sectarian” and “anti-terrorist” have placed distinct legal restrictions on minority congregations’ missionary activity and even basic public outreach,¹⁴⁹ as some public officials believe they serve as “a kind of ‘fifth column’” for Russia’s geopolitical adversaries.¹⁵⁰ Such legislation was used by the Russian Supreme Court to entirely outlaw Jehovah’s Witnesses

143 Alexander Verkhovsky, “The State Against Violence in Spheres Related to Religion,” in *Religion and Violence in Russia* (CSIS, 2018), 19-20.

144 Shakhanova and Kratochvil, 114-115.

145 Knorre and Zygmunt, 12.

146 Geraldine Fagan and Olga Sibireva, “Violence Towards ‘Nontraditional’ Faiths in Russia,” in *Religion and Violence in Russia* (CSIS, 2018), 80.

147 Fagan and Sibireva, 89.

148 Fagan and Sibireva, 90.

149 Verkhovsky, 20

150 Fagan and Sibireva, 83.

organizations as “extremist” in 2017.¹⁵¹

This conflation of heterodoxy with terrorism, state subversion, and dangerous foreign influence through the vagueness of anti-extremist legislation has significant potential to accelerate the transformation of any religious dissent into full-blown, anti-state schism.¹⁵² The sensitivity of the Russian state and Church to cultural and political ‘boogeymen’ from abroad could intensify the degree to which civic dissent or religious dissatisfaction are treated as alien: criticism could be attributed to imagined foreign agents intent on sabotaging the state, rather than to internal Russian activists aiming to reform it. Thus, even earnest efforts at modifying Church behavior may be quickly condemned as imported sedition, excluded, and branded as political and religious heterodoxy. Indeed, those “sectarians” prosecuted for illegal missionary work have already included “alternative” – that is, non-ROC – Orthodox Christians.¹⁵³

Whether or not they have been accused of foreign subversion, heterodox critics who Russia’s spiritual and political authorities persecute as anti-state will likely become anti-state if exclusionary laws are used to criminalize and repress their activities.¹⁵⁴ While this oppositional stance may constitute unfamiliar political territory for some heterodox groups, it would likely only inflame and embolden the anti-Federation and eschatological convictions of the fundamentalists and ethnonationalists discussed earlier. Thus, both the factors which have historically provoked heterodoxy and the factors which have rendered its discourse anti-state and apocalyptic are replicated in contemporary Russia.

6. Conclusion

This paper has advanced four interrelated claims in service of a single conclusion: that there is significant potential for schism within the modern ROC. Firstly, it has shown that the dominant effect of the modern Russian Orthodox Church is to foster broad self-identification with a unified social body. Secondly, it has demonstrated that the Church, through mutual legitimation with the Russian state and a clear emphasis on patriotism and national security, is conforming to historical patterns in aligning membership in its own social body with support for the state and increasingly-sacralized apparatuses of the state. Thirdly, it has analyzed the cases of the Old Believers, Dukhobors, and Pashkovites to illustrate that members of the Russian Orthodox social body have, in the past, become

151 Verkhovsky, 39.

152 Maria Kravchenko, *Inventing Extremists: The Impact of Russian Anti-Extremism Policies on Freedom of Religion or Belief* (USCIRF, 2018), 4.

153 Kravchenko, 25.

154 For detailed documentation of this process, see Kathleen Collins, *Politicizing Islam in Central Asia: Islam and the State from the Russian Revolution to the Syrian Jihad* (Oxford University Press, 2022).

heterodox in rejecting such a Church-state alignment, thereby provoking persecution from both institutions. Fourth and finally, it has outlined the current groups within ROC's social body—universalists, ethnonationalists, fundamentalists, anti-authoritarian or anti-war factions—that could and have articulated their objection to the current Russian state. In making such objections, they now stand to not only oppose the state, but to split from the ROC, and will likely draw the ire of both political and religious orthodoxy in doing so.

This is the unique position of the modern ROC: that it will face the emergence of heterodoxies specifically due to its proximity to the Russian state. It is as a condition of being a sociological orthodoxy that an institutionalized religion must confront and control heterodox alternatives to its proposed ordering of the faithful. That these heterodox alternatives can include those whose repudiation of a religious orthodoxy is predicated on that orthodoxy's alignment with the state is a condition particular to the ROC. In willfully unifying its community of believers with the discourse and objectives of the Russian state, the ROC has exposed itself to heterodox dissent from a diverse range of self-identified Orthodox whose grievances lie not with the Church itself, but with the Church's relationship to the Russian Federation and the Putin regime. As Russia's invasion of Ukraine continues to draw international opprobrium and increasingly incites scrutiny and dissent from the Russian public, scholars of religion and politics should closely monitor the ROC to assess whether it continues its efforts at mutual legitimation or begins to distance itself from the state. Moreover, the discourse of restive clergy and congregants within the ROC should be carefully evaluated for criticism of the Church-state alliance which could provoke heterodox designation, escalating oppositional sentiment, and schism.

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Indigenous Voices at the Top of the World:

Achievements, Setbacks, and Shifting Paradigms on the Arctic Council

Stella Tallmon

This paper dives into the involvement of indigenous peoples on the Arctic Council, an international diplomatic forum. It investigates whether the six indigenous groups who serve as Permanent Participants on the Council have had a tangible impact on its policy outcomes throughout its 25 years of existence. After examining three historical case studies (two agreements and one report) produced by the Council, the conclusion is made that indigenous peoples do have significant influence on the Arctic Council, but they still face barriers to equitable and full involvement, one of the main limits being funding.

1. Introduction

With an alarming concern for climate change, we can look to the Arctic as an important region for the future of the planet on both environmental and political levels. The Arctic has been inhabited for thousands of years by numerous indigenous peoples in modern day Alaska, Canada, Scandinavia, and Russia. This project will examine these peoples' roles in shaping policy on the high-level international regional forum that is the Arctic Council. The Arctic is the fastest-warming region of the world.¹ It is an unwitting repository of global contaminants, and the past, present, and future management of the Arctic's environment will have profound repercussions on the trajectory of both future climate warming and pollution abatement across the globe. Indigenous peoples (IPs) of the world have been historically repressed through centuries of persistent colonization and subjugation, but the Arctic Council (the AC or the Council) is rather unique in the degree that it involves IPs. This research paper will examine the nuances of IP participation on the AC by critically analyzing three recent case studies.

The Arctic Council's Beginnings

In 1987, then-Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev gave a groundbreaking speech in the northern Russian city of Murmansk, calling for the Arctic to be a "zone of peace." Soon after, Finnish diplomats proposed that the eight nations with territory in the Arctic Circle (Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, the United States, and Russia) come together to form a program that would spur environmental and scientific cooperation and coordination in the region. Consequently, in 1991, the Arctic

¹ Buschman, Victoria Qutuug. "Arctic Conservation in the Hands of Indigenous Peoples." *The Wilson Quarterly*, Winter 2022. <https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/the-new-north/arctic-conservation-in-the-hands-of-indigenous-peoples>

Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) was instituted. However, Canada envisioned a more expansive and powerful organization and insisted on revising the new coalition program. After five years of negotiations, the Ottawa Declaration, which created the modern-day Arctic Council, was signed by the aforementioned eight nations and began its environmental-focused work in 1998.² Although it operates on a consensus basis and can only make legally binding decisions if all eight countries consent, the AC was revolutionary and unprecedented because no other international governing bodies gave indigenous peoples roles larger than those of non-governmental organizations and other observers at the time.³ Canadian indigenous leaders were especially strong in their advocacy for this structure,⁴ and Norwegian Saami leader Gunn-Britt Retter believes that, if not for the formation of the AC in the 1990s (an era known for extensive international cooperation), IPs would not have been granted the central role on the council that they continue to play.⁵

The Council's Structure

Historically, IPs across the Arctic have not had the authority to govern their lands post-colonization and occupation, and they have had fewer and fewer opportunities to practice traditional subsistence lifestyles.⁶ The six indigenous groups that have status as Permanent Participants (PPs) in the AC are able to speak during proceedings, serve on working groups and task forces, and negotiate agreements—essentially, they can do everything except vote.⁷ They have more power than the observer non-Arctic countries and NGOs, and until the establishment of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) in 2002, the AC was the only international organization that involved IPs to such a significant degree.⁸

The largest amounts of concrete AC work are conducted within its six Working Groups. The bulk of their funding comes from the Arctic states, especially the Scandinavian ones, and the AC's general budget, but they also collect smaller amounts of funding

2 Axworthy, Thomas S., and Ryan Dean. "Changing the Arctic Paradigm from Cold War to Cooperation: How Canada's Indigenous Leaders Shaped the Arctic Council," in *The Yearbook of Polar Law* V, ed. Gudmundur Alfredsson, Timo Koivurova, and Adam Stiepen, (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2013) 7-43, doi: 10.1163/22116427-91000117.

3 "A Brief History of the Arctic Council." The Arctic Institute, May 2020. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/TAI_Infographic-History-Arctic-Council.pdf

4 Keskitalo, E.C.H. "Chapter 3: The 'Arctic' in the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and Arctic Council: An Environmental, Indigenous, and Foreign Policy Concern." *Negotiating the Arctic: The Construction of an International Region*, (Routledge, 2004) 53-74.

5 Bowen, Stephanie. "Indigenous Leadership in the Arctic: A conversation with Gunn-Britt Retter of the Saami Council." *The Wilson Quarterly*, Feb. 15, 2022. <https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/the-new-north/indigenous-leadership-in-the-arctic>.

6 Buschman, "Arctic Conservation in the Hands of Indigenous Peoples"

7 "About the Arctic Council." Arctic Council. <https://www.arctic-council.org/about/>

8 Axworthy and Dean, "Changing the Arctic Paradigm from Cold War to Cooperation: How Canada's Indigenous Leaders Shaped the Arctic Council"

and some in-kind (non-monetary) support from NGOs.⁹ These NGOs and other outside entities (for example, universities) provide this support from either working groups such as the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) by applying to them for the aid they need, or directly from the entities' voluntary contributions.¹⁰ This system, albeit small, of outside organizations donating to the AC's functions at their discretion could raise concerns about NGOs' and others' involvement in diplomatic matters.

Unprecedented Indigenous Involvement

The level of indigenous inclusion in the Arctic Council is unprecedented and it remains the premier international organization through which IPs can directly impact policy decisions. While the UNPFII spans worldwide, it only serves as an expert advisory body to the UN's Economic and Social Council and thus cannot create binding agreements. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council is another forum in which IPs have an advisory role, but they have not been given Permanent Participant status despite requests.¹¹ Despite all three of these organizations being state-centric, the AC gives the most power to indigenous peoples, as it is the primary forum for a region's governance that uses "soft law" and has IPs in roles in which they do everything the states do except vote.¹² This paper seeks to evaluate the extent to which this unique nature of indigenous involvement on the Arctic Council has resulted in significant impacts on its policy outcomes.

The Permanent Participants

Seven of the eight member-states of the AC have indigenous peoples residing within and across their borders, as Iceland was uninhabited until Vikings settled the island beginning in the 9th and 10th centuries.¹³ Six organizations of IPs are Permanent Participants (PPs) on the AC, many of them representing peoples in multiple states.¹⁴ The first PPs were the Saami Council, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, and the Russian Association of the Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) when they joined the AEPS in 1991. The Aleut International Association was then admitted in 1998, followed by the Arctic

9 Arctic Council Secretariat, "Arctic Council funding: an overview." Arctic Council, March 16-17, 2016, 1-3, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1721/EDOCS-3199-v4-ACSAOUS202_Fairbanks_2016_5-1_Arctic-Council-funding-an-overview.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

10 *Ibid.*, 11.

11 Cambou, Dorothée. "Enhancing the Participation of Indigenous Peoples at the Intergovernmental Level to Strengthen Self-Determination: Lessons from the Arctic." *Nordic Journal of International Law* 87, no. 1, (2018): 26-55, doi: 10.1163/15718107-08701002.

12 Ahmed Khan, Sabaa. "Rebalancing state and Indigenous sovereignties in international law: An Arctic lens on trajectories for global governance." *Leiden Journal of International Law* 32, no. 4, (2019): 675-693, doi: 10.1017/S0922156519000487

13 "History of Iceland." *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Iceland/History>

14 "About the Permanent Participants." Arctic Council, <https://www.arctic-council.org/about/permanent-participants/>

Athabaskan Council and the Gwich'in Council International in 2000.¹⁵ These organizations vary in the number of people they represent—ranging from 9,000 to 250,000— but they all tend to have relatively similar broad goals for their work on the AC, which are to promote the environmental, social, and economic prosperity of their people.¹⁶ However, it is important to note that RAIPON is not as fully representative of all Russian indigenous peoples as it claims to be. Moscow has a complicated history with RAIPON and does not recognize them all, labeling larger groups of IPs as “foreign agents.”¹⁷ RAIPON began operating within the strict limits of the Russian government in 1990; however, from a time between 2012 and 2013, the Ministry of Justice suspended the organization for alleged procedural rule violations and brought it back with leadership that adheres to the Putin government’s wishes.¹⁸

Research and Objectives

This research paper aims to examine and answer the question: to what extent have the Arctic Council’s indigenous Permanent Participants had an effect on the Council’s policy outcomes? Using three case studies, it will explore the different ways they have impacted the AC in a historic study of agreements and reports from 2001, 2004, and 2013. As of autumn 2022, the ongoing war in Ukraine originally paused the Council’s work for three months, and it then resumed in June in only a limited capacity due to the seven Western member states agreeing to not diplomatically cooperate with Russia for the time being.¹⁹ Therefore, while the immediate future of the AC remains murky, we can still use analysis of its previous proceedings to predict what may happen in some of its areas of action when the Council returns to work. In this pivotal era of change across the world, it is crucial to look at this issue especially as it pertains to current global trends of international progressivism, racial reckoning, and decolonization. If other international forums pivot to promote historically excluded indigenous groups above observer status, they may look to the Arctic Council to see what the PPs have done as an example of what to do (or what to avoid) in order to achieve their specific inclusion-related goals.²⁰ Therefore, this study provides the necessary historical context needed to watch for patterns emerging in the future that demonstrate indigenous influence both in and out of the Arctic Council.

15 “The history of the Arctic Council.” Arctic Council, <https://www.arctic-council.org/about/timeline/>

16 “About the Permanent Participants.”

17 “Indigenous Peoples in Russia.” International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, <https://www.iwgia.org/en/russia.html>

18 Chater, Andrew. “Change and Continuity Among the Priorities of the Arctic Council’s Permanent Participants,” in *Leadership for the North: The Influence and Impact of Arctic Council Chairs*, ed. Douglas C. Nord, (Springer Polar Sciences, 2019) https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-03107-7_9#Sec5

19 Jonassen, Trine. “The Arctic Council: The Arctic 7 Resume Limited Work Without Russia.” High North News, June 8th, 2022. <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/arctic-council-arctic-7-resume-limited-work-without-russia>.

20 Buschman, “Arctic Conservation in the Hands of Indigenous Peoples.”

2. Literature Review

Strong Influence

One category of viewpoints asserts that IPs do have significant power on the AC, and that their status as PPs has enabled them to shape the Council's policies in many instances. Compared to the UNPFII and the BEAC, the AC is a stronger example of expanded indigenous inclusion because IPs have strong procedural roles that extend beyond simply providing advice to other bodies.²¹ Additionally, while each of the seven nations with indigenous peoples have significant domestic disputes and issues with them while on home ground, they have not brought these affairs to the AC, and their concerns "are not reflected in the working structures of [the Council]."²² The United States, Canada, and Denmark (via Greenland) have brutal histories of colonization, and indigenous communities continue to struggle with those legacies in terms of racism, land rights, socioeconomic inequality, mental health issues, and general access to public goods and resources.²³ The Saami people living in northern Scandinavia and part of northwestern Russia face challenges across their homelands largely relating to extractive industries,²⁴ and a meager 40 out of 180 Russian indigenous groups are recognized as such by their government and consequently suffer from having even fewer political, legal, and land rights than IPs in other countries.²⁵ Yet, the AC has always conducted itself in a more inclusive manner than the Saami's home countries and prided itself on the equal participatory rights that the PPs have.²⁶ While it is still a state-centric body, as only the "Arctic Eight" countries vote, Nikolas Sellheim argues that overall, the AC has expanded serious discourse on indigenous peoples and their rights in many avenues in the international community.²⁷

Finnish political scientist Dorothee Cambou states that by way of full participation, the PPs are "highly influential" to the AC's decision-making process.²⁸ Moreover, fellow Finns Timo Koivurova and Leena Heinämäki emphasize that "[e]ven though final decisions are made by the Arctic states in consensus, the permanent participants must, according to [the AC's founding document], be fully consulted, which is a de facto power

21 Cambou, "Enhancing the Participation of Indigenous Peoples at the Intergovernmental Level to Strengthen Self-Determination: Lessons from the Arctic," 47.

22 Sellheim, Nikolas. "The Arctic Council and the Advancement of Indigenous Rights." *Arctic Triumph*, ed. Nikolas Sellheim, Yulia V. Zaika, and Ilan Kelman (Springer, 2019), 121.

23 *Ibid.*, 110-114.

24 "Indigenous Peoples in Sapmi" International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. <https://www.iwgia.org/en/sapmi.html>

25 "Indigenous Peoples in Russia."

26 Sellheim, "The Arctic Council and the Advancement of Indigenous Rights," 121.

27 *Ibid.*

28 Cambou, "Enhancing the Participation of Indigenous Peoples at the Intergovernmental Level to Strengthen Self-Determination: Lessons from the Arctic," 48.

should they all reject a particular proposal.”²⁹ They and Cambou all argue that IP participation in the AC is a prime example of “soft law,” the process of creating international norms and setting standards through non-binding agreements and programs, often with broad guidelines.³⁰ While they are not enshrined in international law, soft laws are powerful because they have strong political and moral implications, along with being susceptible to expansion and open to the influence of non-state actors.³¹ Cambou contrasts the AC’s Permanent Participants’ levels of influence with that of IPs on the UNPFII; and she then credits the AC as a pioneer of soft law and indigenous inclusion in addition to slowly becoming a forum for policymaking over time.³² Moreover, she promotes her stance that IPs are very influential on the AC by discussing the council’s recognition of traditional knowledge to help shape Arctic policy, especially as it relates to the environment.³³ She believes that this incorporation balances state and indigenous needs by not prioritizing one over the other, creating even more tangible indigenous influence while showing that the states are productively listening to them.³⁴

In a 2019 quantitative study analyzing the priorities and accomplishments of the Permanent Participants and how they have worked with state leadership throughout the AC’s history, Andrew Chater found that the PPs have been able to significantly steer the Council’s priorities.³⁵ In particular, they have been successful in promoting the sponsorship of local projects and agendas that the state-centric body might have otherwise ignored. He concludes that although the member states have more overall power, the IPs on the Council balance out their state-centric interests in a way that is not present in any other international body.³⁶

Particularly in terms of environmental governance, some argue that the AC should be a model for other international fora on how to effectively include and engage IPs. For example, Marjo Lindroth and Heidi Sinevaara-Niskanen state that it is “illustrative of how indigenous peoples have been integrated into environmental debates on the international level. The peoples themselves have been active in arguing for the inclusion of

29 Koivurova, Timo and Leena Heinämäki. “The Participation of Indigenous Peoples in International Norm-Making in the Arctic.” *The Polar Record* 42, no. 2 (2006): 104.

30 Cambou, “Enhancing the Participation of Indigenous Peoples at the Intergovernmental Level to Strengthen Self-Determination: Lessons from the Arctic,” 50; Koivurova and Heinämäki, “The Participation of Indigenous Peoples in International Norm-Making in the Arctic,” 103.

31 *Ibid.*, 103-104.

32 Cambou, “Enhancing the Participation of Indigenous Peoples at the Intergovernmental Level to Strengthen Self-Determination: Lessons from the Arctic,” 50.

33 *Ibid.*, 50-51.

34 *Ibid.*, 50-51.

35 Chater, “Change and Continuity Among the Priorities of the Arctic Council’s Permanent Participants.”

36 *Ibid.*

their knowledge and contributions in these debates.³⁷ Sabaa Ahmed Khan acknowledges that while it is not perfect, the AC is a good example of an international body that centers indigenous voices while also respecting its member states' sovereignty.³⁸ As the climate crisis intensifies, she believes more conversations and negotiations about environmental policy should emulate the Council's indigenous inclusion.³⁹ The fact that many political scientists see the AC as guided by both indigenous and state interests is a meritable contrast from the opposing viewpoint, which will be discussed next.

Insignificant Impacts

Other scholars disagree with the previous assessment, however, taking the stance that IPs are not particularly influential to the Arctic Council's policy outcomes. Danita Catherine Burke argues that the "club diplomacy" that exists within the AC has led to the U.S. and Russia being on top of its internal hierarchy overall. Furthermore, she argues that status has become the most important part of the Council, only allowing it to serve powerful states' interests most of the time.⁴⁰ She claims that the PPs, alongside Canada, lead negotiations amongst the AC members only regarding issues of indigenous representation.⁴¹ Inuit researcher Victoria Qutuuq Buschman believes that the policies, especially having to do with conservation and education, that IPs push in many levels of government across the Arctic are not adequately acknowledged or taken into account.⁴² Ingrid Medby expresses the sentiment that ultimately just the voices of the AC's eight member-states truly influence policy outcomes and claims that consultative status for IPs is not sufficient input to the Council's policies.⁴³ Moreover, she states that IPs are often tokenized on the AC and their perspectives and traditional knowledge are only incorporated when it fits the states' interests.⁴⁴

Norwegian political scientist Svein Vigeland Rottem conducted a study on the progress of the Arctic Contaminant Action Program (ACAP) working group in 2019, in which he examined ACAP records and interviewed people "with experience in the work

37 Lindroth, Marjo, and Heidi Sinevaara-Niskanen. "At the Crossroads of Autonomy and Essentialism: Indigenous Peoples in International Environmental Politics." *International Political Sociology* 7, no. 3 (2013): 275-293, doi: 10.1111/ips.12023

38 Ahmed Khan, "Rebalancing state and Indigenous sovereignties in international law: An Arctic lens on trajectories for global governance."

39 Ibid.

40 Burke, Danita Catherine. "Conceptualizing the Book," in *Diplomacy and the Arctic Council* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2019), 35, doi: 10.2307/j.ctvw1d7nv.5.

41 Ibid., 25.

42 Buschman, "Arctic Conservation in the Hands of Indigenous Peoples."

43 Medby, Ingrid. "State Discourses of Indigenous "Inclusion": Identity and Representation in the Arctic." *Antipode* 51, no. 4 (2019): 1276-1295, doi: 10.1111/anti.12542.

44 Ibid.

of ACAP.⁴⁵ In one section of the report, Rottem analyzed the Indigenous Peoples Contaminant Action Program (IPCAP) expert group within ACAP, whose mission it is to monitor and reduce the exposure of Arctic IPs to toxic pollutants, and noted that it was the only expert group mandated to have a PP co-chair.⁴⁶ Additionally, his interviewees “emphasized the difficulties encountered in implementing projects, especially on the Russian side.”⁴⁷ This suggests that while efforts by IPs to affect the AC’s directives and actions are strong, the state-centric structure sometimes prevents them from full inclusion and implementation of their goals. The results of a quantitative and qualitative survey conducted by Paula Kankaanpää and Oran R. Young in 2012 of individuals who had been involved with or closely observed the AC echoed this sentiment, and they overall encouraged the restructuring of working groups to enhance inclusion of IPs, among other procedures.⁴⁸

These two surveys indicate that the impact of the PPs has not been adequate or significant enough to satisfy at least some AC insiders, and this could be drawn back to the power imbalance between the states and the PPs on the AC and the fact that it was not primarily created by IPs. As Lindroth and Sinevaara-Niskanen ask in their 2017 book *Global Politics and Its Violent Care for Indigeneity*, “how [can] the inclusion of the peoples in political structures built by the powers who colonized them... resolve the peoples’ colonial dispossession[?]”⁴⁹ Another element of the Council’s structure [that is criticized for not allowing enough indigenous influence is the financial one. Margherita Paola Poto argues that there is a lack of sufficient funding for PPs and their Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat on the AC, and they do not have the resources to sponsor as many projects or propose as many objectives because “a long-term policy-making vision on funding allocations to IP groups is still missing.”⁵⁰

3. Research Methodology

The first research for this project was conducted by filtering through the readings for our Colloquium on the Politics of the Arctic, two of which are represented in this pa-

45 Vigeland Rottem, Svein. “Improving the work of the Arctic Council: challenges and recommendations.” *The Polar Record* 57 (2021), doi: [10.1017/S0032247420000492](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247420000492).

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Kankaanpää, Paula, and Oran R. Young. “The effectiveness of the Arctic Council.” *Polar Research* 31, no. 1, (2012): 1-14, doi: <https://doi.org/10.3402/polar.v31i0.17176>.

49 Lindroth, Marjo, and Heidi Sinevaara-Niskanen. “Excluded in the Past, Celebrated in the Present,” in *Global Politics and Its Violent Care for Indigeneity*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): 27-53.

50 Poto, Margherita Paola. “Participatory engagement and the empowerment of the Arctic Indigenous Peoples.” *Environmental Law Review* 19, no. 1 (2017): 30-47, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1461452917691778>.

per. Next, scrupulous Internet and Columbia Libraries Catalog (CLIO) searches were conducted in the field of study. The latter yielded most of the articles from scholarly journals cited in this piece. They are from a variety of dates throughout the last twenty-five years so as many perspectives as possible could be used. Next, news articles on the subjects of the AC and Arctic indigenous peoples were garnered from searches in large news sites such as the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and Financial Times; and also the more regional Anchorage Daily News and Barents Observer. Additionally, webpages on sites of NGOs that monitor indigenous politics and rights were used to gather background information on some of the PPs. While the Arctic Council website is not particularly vast, it does have significant information about its history (including pages on each PP) and retains an archive of reports, speeches, and declarations from its past 25 years of work.⁵¹

An original goal for this project was to interview as many representatives of the six Permanent Participants as possible, but this did not come to fruition. All but the Gwich'in Council International (who denied it) did not respond to interview requests, so this research had to rely on their previous statements, literature, and interviews for direct indigenous perspectives. Of particular value was a page of the AC's website that has compiled videos of IPs speaking on the various accomplishments and agenda items that the PPs have already made or wish to achieve in the Council's future.⁵² There, IPs highlight a number of topics such as traditional knowledge, pollution, and climate change, as well as problems specific to their communities they would like to fix and their overarching views on the AC and its future. This page was exceptionally helpful in selecting which agreements and reports to use as case studies, as well as in writing the conclusion of the paper.

4. Findings

The Case Studies

To test the viewpoints outlined in the literature review – that IPs either have or have not had a significant impact on the AC's policy outcomes – three cases were selected. Because the Council's work has primarily focused on sustainability and the environment, all cases are in those fields.⁵³ They are the 2001 Stockholm Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) Convention, the 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) Report, and the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA). All three agreements are at least nine years old from the time of

51 "The Arctic Council: Home." Arctic Council, <https://www.arctic-council.org/>

52 Crump, John, Levi Westerfeld, and Rob Barnes. "Story Map: Influencing Arctic Environmental Politics." GRID-Arendal, 2016, <https://grid-arendal.maps.arcgis.com/apps/Cascade/index.html?appid=900ddaf2707f44dfa943bba4a2db2b41>

53 Ahmed Khan, "Rebalancing state and Indigenous sovereignties in international law: An Arctic lens on trajectories for global governance."

writing, and this time frame was deliberately chosen in order to study the reverberations and overall consequences of each one following its signing or release. They are to be interpreted as historical case studies with at least somewhat measurable outcomes.

2001 Stockholm Persistent Organic Pollutants Convention

One of the first large actions taken with the AC as a benefactor was the signing by 184 countries of the Stockholm POPs Convention in 2001, which came after years of negotiations at the United Nations.⁵⁴ But prior to those deliberations, the AC's Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) working group planted the seeds with its 1998 report entitled *Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment Report*.⁵⁵ AMAP itself is a working group that is assigned "to produce assessment reports on pollution and climate status and trends in Arctic ecosystems; to identify causes for changing conditions; to detect new problems, their causes and potential risks to the ecosystem and indigenous peoples and residents of the Arctic; and to recommend required actions."⁵⁶ The report contained a chapter on POPs, specifically the "dirty dozen" toxic chemicals which were gaining prevalence in the Arctic and biologically harming animals via multiple pathways.⁵⁷ Experts from indigenous groups contributed to it thanks to financial support from Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the United States, the Nordic Council of Ministers, and the United Nations Environmental Programme.⁵⁸

At the UN negotiations for the Stockholm Convention, representatives of some Arctic IPs were present as part of the United States and Canada's delegations.⁵⁹ Various Canadian IP groups, some of whom were not yet on the AC, formed a coalition at the UN entitled *Canadian Arctic Indigenous Peoples Against POPs (CAIPAP)* to push for a full ban of the twelve chemicals identified as devastatingly harmful in the AMAP report.⁶⁰ They were able to attend via the Inuit Circumpolar Council's observer status but could not participate, and the GRID Arendal webpage states that "Arctic concerns were taken

54 Crump, Westerfeld, and Barnes, "Story Map: Influencing Arctic Environmental Politics."

55 "On the Heels of Persistent Organic Pollutants." Arctic Council, May 10th, 2021, <https://www.arctic-council.org/news/on-the-heels-of-persistent-pollutants/>

56 Richwalder, Matthew. "The Arctic Council: Twenty Years in the Making and Moving Forward." *Ocean & Coastal Law Journal* 22, no.1 (2017) 32.

57 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme. "Chapter 6: Persistent Organic Pollutants." *Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment Report*, Arctic Council, 1998, https://oarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/923/SOAE97_06.PDF.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y.

58 Stone, David, Lars-Erik Liljelund, and Lars-Otto Reiersen. "Preface." *Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment Report*, Arctic Council, 1998, https://oarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/923/SOAE97_FRONT.PDF.pdf?sequence=13&isAllowed=y.

59 Cambou, "Enhancing the Participation of Indigenous Peoples at the Intergovernmental Level to Strengthen Self-Determination: Lessons from the Arctic," 36.

60 Crump, Westerfeld, and Barnes, "Story Map: Influencing Arctic Environmental Politics."

up by Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Canada.”⁶¹ Their goals were achieved when the UN negotiations resulted in a relatively expansive treaty, which was the first multilateral international environmental agreement to mention the Arctic and IPs specifically.⁶² Ahmed Khan describes the ICC specifically as having made “a critical contribution” to the final agreement,⁶³ and Cambou and Koivuova argue that it “played an instrumental role” despite its observer status at the UN.⁶⁴

The Stockholm Convention’s preamble “acknowledges ‘that the Arctic ecosystems and indigenous communities are particularly at risk because of the biomagnification of persistent organic pollutants and that contamination of their traditional foods is a public health issue.’” Cindy Dickson, the executive director of the Arctic Athabaskan Council who was a member of CAIPAP, stated in an interview that “we pushed for this convention to become what it is today.” We can easily see how the Stockholm Convention is an example of the AC spurring binding international policy with significant indigenous input via its research and worldly influence.⁶⁵

Because most of the AC’s activities happen within its six Working Groups, there exists clear evidence that the Council’s environmental work significantly promotes indigenous interests.⁶⁶ The AC’s website indicates that although 14 more pollutants have been added to the Stockholm Convention since 2001 and POPs levels have generally declined, the problems associated with these contaminants are far from resolved, and AMAP’s research plays a critical role in promoting enhanced progress on pollution prevention.⁶⁷ Even if the policy changes did not occur within the AC, the Stockholm POPs Convention was certainly a result of AMAP sounding the alarm on these toxic chemicals, with particular attention to associated indigenous issues and interests.

2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Report

AMAP continued its environmental work with the release of the 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) called *Impacts of a Warming Arctic*. It was groundbreaking for several reasons, but primarily because it was one of the first large-scale scientific reports on the effects of climate change on the Arctic.⁶⁸ In particular, it brought

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Ahmed Khan, “Rebalancing state and Indigenous sovereignties in international law: An Arctic lens on trajectories for global governance.”

64 Cambou, Dorothee and Timo Koivuova. “The participation of Arctic indigenous peoples’ organizations in the Arctic Council and beyond,” in *Routledge Handbook of Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic*, ed. Timo Koivuova (Taylor & Francis Group, 2020), 328.

65 Crump, Westerfeld, and Barnes, “Story Map: Influencing Arctic Environmental Politics.”

66 Vigeland Rottem, “Improving the work of the Arctic Council: challenges and recommendations.”

67 “On the Heels of Persistent Organic Pollutants.”

68 Crump, Westerfeld, and Barnes, “Story Map: Influencing Arctic Environmental Politics.”

attention to the melting polar ice cap and received substantial press coverage compared to other climate reports in the early and mid-2000s.⁶⁹⁷⁰

AMAP and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) working groups spearheaded the research for the report, with all six PPs participating as well.⁷¹ The full report was 126 pages long and delved into many subtopics, one of them being indigenous experiences.⁷² The chapter entitled “Indigenous Perspectives” describes the IPs on the front lines of Arctic climate change and draws from case studies and interviews researchers conducted with a number of IPs around the Arctic.⁷³ The report examines already existing and upcoming changes for IPs in terms of food sources, infrastructure, weather patterns, and mental health due to Arctic warming; and it significantly stresses the overall socioeconomic impacts of climate change on their lifestyles and cultural traditions.⁷⁴ This emphasis on socioeconomic components was not originally intended to be part of the report’s final draft, but the PPs were able to convince Iceland to make sure that it was included, using the de facto veto power outlined by Koivurova and Heinämäki.⁷⁵⁷⁶

Besides presenting a plethora of in-depth evidence supporting the severity of climate change in the Arctic, the ACIA report was the first time that an AC report examined how traditional indigenous knowledge can be incorporated with Western science to produce cutting-edge research.⁷⁷ It is now more and more common for the Council’s working groups to use traditional knowledge in their reports because of the trend that Impacts of a Warming Arctic set off. The GRID Arendal page states that in its aftermath, “[besides] contributing to the assessment, the Permanent Participants took the lead in telling the story about the global implications of Arctic climate change.”⁷⁸ It also noted that rural Russian IPs are not heard enough in assessments like these.⁷⁹

In the aftermath of the ACIA report, the dangers of climate change in the Arctic

69 Clark, Pilita. “The mystery of the disappearing Arctic sea ice.” *Financial Times*, Feb. 6th, 2013, <https://www.ft.com/content/dec8f5c6-704c-11e2-ab31-00144feab49a>.

70 Ekwurzel, Brenda, Peter C. Frumhoff, and James J. McCarthy. “Climate uncertainties and their discontents: increasing the impact of assessments on public understanding of climate risks and choices.” *Climatic Change* 108, no. 4 (2011), doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0194-6>.

71 Sellheim, “The Arctic Council and the Advancement of Indigenous Rights,” 119.

72 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme. “Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Report: Impacts of a Warming Arctic.” Arctic Council Archives, 2004, <https://www.amap.no/documents/doc/arctic-arctic-climate-impact-assessment/796>.

73 *Ibid.*, 61-98.

74 *Ibid.*, 92-97.

75 Sellheim, “The Arctic Council and the Advancement of Indigenous Rights,” 119.

76 Koivurova and Heinämäki, “The Participation of Indigenous Peoples in International Norm-Making in the Arctic,” 104.

77 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, “Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Report: Impacts of a Warming Arctic,” 64-72.

78 Crump, Westerfeld, and Barnes, “Story Map: Influencing Arctic Environmental Politics.”

79 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, “Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Report: Impacts of a Warming Arctic,” 87.

became internationally known and gave the AC more recognition for its use of in-depth socioeconomic analysis throughout the chapter on IPs.⁸⁰ In 2008, the Union of Concerned Scientists lauded it as pioneering and expressed confidence in its ability to aid scientists around the world when researching climate change and related topics not only in the Arctic, but around the world.⁸¹ The report recommended many actions (albeit vaguely), but in late 2004 the AC passed a resolution called the ACIA Policy Document, which pledged to take climate action via both mitigation (in this case, emissions restrictions) and adaptation efforts.⁸² This resolution was developed by the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) at the time, who are an advisory board made up of a diplomat from each member state and PP group.⁸³⁸⁴

In addition to this tangible policy outcome, Vigeland Rottem notes that this report helped spur the creation of the Arctic Contaminants Action Programme as the sixth independent AC working group in 2006 and helped pivot the Council from focusing its environmental activities primarily on contaminants and pollution to concentrating on climate change overall.⁸⁵⁸⁶ The working group entitled Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) has also used the ACIA report as a basis for much of its work on biodiversity and sustainability in the Arctic.⁸⁷ In fact, *Impacts of a Warming Arctic* is the AC's most-cited scientific work to date.⁸⁸

The 2004 ACIA report and subsequent AC resolution reiterated the direct involvement of Arctic IPs that was present in the lead-up to the Stockholm Convention, yet it also goes further with its use of indigenous traditional knowledge.⁸⁹ Spanish researcher Marzia Scopelliti states that although the resolution was nonbinding, the representation of IPs is “of great relevance”⁹⁰ and that “by virtue of [traditional] knowledge, Arctic indigenous peoples have substantially contributed to the drafting of regional reports on the state of the Arctic environment.”⁹¹ As this cooperation was successful, it shows that the research

80 Scopelliti, Marzia. “Non-Governmental Actors in International Climate Change Law: The Case of Arctic Indigenous Peoples.” (London and New York: Routledge, 2022), 56.

81 “Reports & Multimedia Explainer: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment.” Union of Concerned Scientists, Jul. 16, 2008, <https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/arctic-climate-impact-assessment>

82 Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group. “Arctic Climate Impact Assessment: Policy Document.” Arctic Council Archives, Nov. 24th, 2004, <https://www.caff.is/assessment-series/36-arctic-climate-impact-assessment-policy-document>.

83 “Arctic Climate Impact Assessment: Policy Document,” 4.

84 Richwalder, “The Arctic Council: Twenty Years in the Making and Moving Forward,” 29.

85 “The history of the Arctic Council.”

86 Vigeland Rottem, “Improving the work of the Arctic Council: challenges and recommendations.”

87 Richwalder, “The Arctic Council: Twenty Years in the Making and Moving Forward,” 33.

88 Vigeland Rottem, “Improving the work of the Arctic Council: challenges and recommendations.”

89 Scopelliti, “Non-Governmental Actors in International Climate Change Law: The Case of Arctic Indigenous Peoples,” 67.

90 *Ibid.*, 66.

91 *Ibid.*, 67.

on the Council can work well for IPs and that when fully involved, their perspectives do matter greatly.

2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic

The most recent of the three case studies, this agreement (also known as MO-SPA) dealt with Arctic oil spills and the roles each AC member state must take in the event of one. It is one of the Council's three binding agreements and the only one focusing specifically on the environment.⁹² The agreement was first drafted by a task force within the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (EPPR) between 2011 and 2013, and then signed at the 2013 Ministerial Meeting in Sweden.⁹³ The task force was chaired by diplomats from the United States, Russia, and Norway.⁹⁴ They released a report of recommendations to the Council about what an oil spill preparedness and response agreement should look like,⁹⁵ and then the full Council negotiated the final agreement.⁹⁶ Poto approves of it and states that IPs "played an active role in making their voices heard and consequently their participatory rights emphasized in the text of the agreement," and she also takes note of the MOSPA's mention of the need to engage IPs in the processes outlined. This issue of oil spills has special connotations among Alaska Natives, some of whom were greatly affected for decades after a large spill in the Gulf of Alaska in 1989 devastated coastal indigenous communities near the Arctic.⁹⁷

However, the agreement was also controversial for several reasons. Environmental organizations criticized it as bare-boned and weak, with Greenpeace calling it "absolutely useless due to understated requirements for the Arctic oil operations,"⁹⁸ and an analysis by the Arctic Institute at the Center for Circumpolar Studies proclaiming that it does not "[focus] on preventing accidents or addressing Arctic-specific response prob-

92 "The history of the Arctic Council."

93 Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Working Group. "Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic." Arctic Council Archives, May 15th, 2013, <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/529>.

94 "Senior Arctic Officials' Report to Ministers: Kiruna, Sweden." Arctic Council, May 15th, 2013, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/848/MM08_Kiruna_SAO_Report_to_Ministers_Final_formatted.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

95 Rossi, Brianne. "Summary Report and Recommendations on the Prevention of Marine Oil Pollution in the Arctic." Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Working Group, 2013, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/106/Summary_Report_%20and%20Recommendations_on%20the%20Prevention_of%20Arctic_Marine_Oil_Pollution%20%287%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

96 Boyd, Alex. "Binding oil spill agreement signed." The Barents Observer, May 15th, 2013, <https://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2013/05/binding-oil-spill-agreement-signed-15-05>.

97 "Native Alaskans Still Reeling 25 Years After Exxon-Valdez Oil Spill." WBUR Boston, Mar. 24th, 2014, <https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2014/03/24/exxon-spill-anniversary>.

98 Kireeva, Anna. "Toothless oil spill preparedness agreement." The Barents Observer, Apr. 4th, 2013, <https://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2013/04/toothless-oil-spill-preparedness-agreement-04-04>.

lems, such as the lack of infrastructure.⁹⁹ The GRID Arendal page on indigenous environmental politics in the Arctic did not mention it among the achievements of IPs on the AC,¹⁰⁰ and Cambou and Koivuova also point out that while the process leading up to MOSPA included IP participation, the agreement itself only mentions them sporadically.¹⁰¹ Additionally, during a speech at the 2013 Ministerial Meeting where the agreement was adopted, Arctic Athabaskan Council representative Michael Stickman claimed that the AC had not “grasped the nettle” on MOSPA.¹⁰²

Despite the grievances with the agreement, it is still considered as an example of IPs affecting the Council’s policy outcomes, albeit in a less influential way. The agreement was the first to unite all eight Arctic countries on oil spill preparation and procedures, as well as its intent being to prompt the member states to consider oil spills more seriously.¹⁰³ This resulted in further progress in the years after, with MOSPA serving as motivation for the AC to continue working on oil spill issues, particularly with its 2015 adaptation of the Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the Marine Areas of the Arctic.¹⁰⁴ While both PPs and outsiders have mixed views on the success of MOSPA, we can reasonably say that it is an example of IPs having had varied outcomes based on their participation on the AC and influencing Council policies to lower degrees than in the previous two case studies.

5. Conclusion

Case Study Results

Each of these three case studies presented scenarios where indigenous Permanent Participants contributed to the Arctic Council’s environmental reports or agreements and sought to explain the extent of their participation and their effect on the final products and outcomes. Overall, PPs appear to have significantly influenced the 2001 Stockholm POPs Convention, the 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, and their subsequent actions and policies; but it is unclear whether or not they made an impact on the 2013

99 Shapovalova, Daria. “Can International Law Protect the Arctic from Oil Spills?” The Arctic Institute, Mar. 26th, 2019, <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/international-law-protect-arctic-oil-spills/>.

100 Crump, Westerfeld, and Barnes, “Story Map: Influencing Arctic Environmental Politics.”

101 Cambou and Koivuova, “The participation of Arctic indigenous peoples’ organizations in the Arctic Council and beyond,” 330.

102 Stickman, Michael. “Remarks by Michael Stickman, International Chair, Arctic Athabaskan Council.” Arctic Council Archive, May 15th, 2013, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1569/ACMM08_Kiruna_2013_Statement_AAC_Michael_Stickman.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y.

103 Boyd, “Binding oil spill agreement signed.”

104 Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Working Group. “Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the Marine Areas of the Arctic.” Arctic Council Archives, May 11th, 2015, <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1938?show=full#:~:text=The%20objective%20of%20the%20Framework,protect%20the%20Arctic%20marine%20environment>.

MOSPA. The Saami leader Retter expresses in the first video of her on the GRID Arendal website that the AC would have had very different priorities and agendas had it not been for the PPs,¹⁰⁵ which holds true in the first two cases. Yet, we must also acknowledge that the contributions of PPs may be most substantial in cases where they and member states have overlapping goals. That said, it is also evident that the PPs bring a different perspective to negotiations and research. Cambou and Koivurova sum it up well in their paper on IP participation in the Arctic, where they explain that, while IPs have had a lot of influence and moved their community initiatives up the AC's order of priorities, events such as the leadup to the 2013 agreement bring up some important issues with funding and intentional inclusion.¹⁰⁶ Ultimately, the first theory examined in the literature review – that IPs have had heavy influence on the AC's policy outcomes – is strongly supported, but a second finding must also be factored into the conclusion of this paper, as there is evidence of limitations to the influence of IPs and their inclusion in all aspects of the Council.

Traditional Knowledge on the Council

As mentioned in the previous analysis of the 2004 ACIA report, traditional and local indigenous knowledge is becoming increasingly common in the AC's materials. However, IPs generally have a sense that while this knowledge is certainly impacting the Council's proceedings and reports, there is still much progress that should be made. As defined by the PPs themselves:

Traditional Knowledge is a systematic way of thinking and knowing that is elaborated and applied to phenomena across biological, physical, cultural and linguistic systems. Traditional Knowledge is owned by the holders of that knowledge, often collectively, and is uniquely expressed and transmitted through indigenous languages. It is a body of knowledge generated through cultural practices, lived experiences including extensive and multigenerational observations, lessons and skills. It has been developed and verified over millennia and is still developing in a living process, including knowledge acquired today and in the future, and it is passed on from generation to generation.¹⁰⁷

Ethel Blake, former chair of the Gwich'in Council International, proclaims in a video on the GRID Arendal site that "it is time to integrate traditional knowledge into all workings of the Arctic Council," and other IPs such as Karen Pletnikoff and Jim Gamble

105 Crump, Westerfeld, and Barnes, "Story Map: Influencing Arctic Environmental Politics."

106 Cambou and Koivurova, "The participation of Arctic indigenous peoples' organizations in the Arctic Council and beyond," 328-330.

107 "Ottawa Traditional Knowledge Principles." Arctic Council Permanent Participants, <https://www.arcticpeoples.com/knowledge#indigenous-knowledge>.

agree that it has not been incorporated in a robust manner.¹⁰⁸ There is still lots of debate on what this should look like on the AC, but change may be coming after the PPs passed a policy document called the Ottawa Traditional Knowledge Principles in 2015, which outlines their vision for what role traditional knowledge should play in the Council's proceedings.¹⁰⁹

Lack of Funding

Another issue that came up throughout the research for this paper was that the PPs' funding for their AC activities and for the Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat (IPS) is voluntarily provided by the states.¹¹⁰ Chater's study listed funding as a reason for the lower numbers of projects sponsored by PPs, and Retter heavily emphasized their lack of finances as a large barrier to taking more actions on the Council during an interview with *The Wilson Quarterly*.¹¹¹ If the IPS were boosted financially, it could potentially be expanded to become as helpful to the PPs with secretarial and administrative duties as the AC Secretariat is to the member states.¹¹² The PPs have also set up the Ålgu Fund to raise money as "part of a long-term commitment [they] have to the Arctic Council," and this is a project that will be interesting to follow in both the near and far future.¹¹³

Why This Matters

The indigenous peoples on the Arctic Council have certainly made significant impacts on its policies, and despite its status as a soft-law forum, the AC's work is very important. In these three historic case studies, it was clearly illustrated that indigenous peoples have influenced the decision-making process at the Council to further their interests regionally and internationally. Yet, there is more work to complete when it comes to traditional knowledge and funding for the Permanent Participants; especially if the AC continues on its more current track of becoming policy-making rather than policy-shaping as it was in the past.¹¹⁴ Building on the existing structure and frameworks, which presently include IPs, is the right path forward for the AC; but care must be taken to avoid more negotiations and policies such as the MOSPA and instead focus on those that are beneficial for and recognizable of all parties. The Council could serve as a model for

108 Crump, Westerfeld, and Barnes, "Story Map: Influencing Arctic Environmental Politics."

109 "Indigenous Peoples' Knowledge." Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat, <https://www.arcticpeoples.com/knowledge#traditional-knowledge-1>.

110 Poto, "Participatory engagement and the empowerment of the Arctic Indigenous Peoples"

111 Bowen, "Indigenous Leadership in the Arctic: A conversation with Gunn-Britt Retter of the Saami Council."

112 Richwalder, "The Arctic Council: Twenty Years in the Making and Moving Forward," 30.

113 Crump, Westerfeld, and Barnes, "Story Map: Influencing Arctic Environmental Politics."

114 Scopelliti, "Non-Governmental Actors in International Climate Change Law: The Case of Arctic Indigenous Peoples," 67-68.

other intergovernmental bodies in which indigenous peoples have attained a high level of self-determination and shared governance. However, there are certainly internal issues with funding, inclusion, and traditional knowledge that must be remedied by the Council before other governance structures begin to use this model. With everything, including the rapidly changing climate that is occurring in the High North and in the world right now, more and more eyes will be on this environmental-focused organization to see if it can instigate truly inclusive change.

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“Queering le Strade”:

An Analysis of Framing Tactics in Italian Pride Parades in Bologna & Rome Oli Vorster

The field of Pride Studies remains a contentious subject both within academia and activism. Common narratives within the field revolve around three main conceptions: LGBTQ+ visibility, commercialization, and Pride’s ability to impact the politics and social norms of the places it inhabits. While these are viable courses of analysis, my focus for this dissertation will be how Italian LGBTQ+ activists conceptualize their queerness and translate it visibly through the stage of Pride. Through this “queering of the space,” activists utilize framing devices local to their geopolitical environment. Thereby, producing a queer visual landscape within heteronormative spaces that reflects their conceptualized cultural, social, and religious values. My findings within the case studies of Bologna and Rome suggest that Bologna produces a more radical and localized Pride in its framing negotiation, while Rome fabricates internationalist, commercialized, and universalist human rights-oriented framing. Due to the presence of these framing anomalies, further research should be conducted on this topic more in depth, such as on the impact of transnational movement networks and inter-state actors on Pride framing.

Overall, this project contributes to the extant scholarship in the following ways: first, it supports, but complicates, theories around framing and political meaning-making in European social movement settings. Second, it produces a visual ethnographic analysis of Italian queer visibility through framing tactics. Third, it provides a first-of-its-kind comparative analysis between frames used in different types of urban environments in Rome and Bologna. Finally, countering macro-oriented reductionist claims of Pride through conceptions of “critical regionality,” I show that different urban contexts inside one country produce diverging orienting framing tactics through a process of localized Pride-based framing negotiation and manifestation.

1. A Research Puzzle - Italian Peripherality & The “Stonewall Myth

This study is concentrated on the research gap that exists within Pride Studies, challenging the broad sweeping analysis of Pride at the national level in favor of a deepening understanding of the urban, political, and social contexts in which LGBTQ+ social movements inhabit.¹ Working off Binnie’s (2016) claims on critical regionality, my thesis focuses on a localized comparative analysis of Pride as an urban stage. I ask, “why do Prides look so different across different cities?”² More specifically, how do differing

1 Di Feliciantonio, In Italy It’s Different: Pride as a Space of Political Contention, 103

2 Binnie, Critical Queer Regionality and LGBTQ Politics in Europe, 82

OLI VORSTER is a recent graduate of Occidental College with a Major in Diplomacy & World Affairs and a minor in Religious Studies. Following their graduation, they are studying abroad in Siena, Italy and in the Spring of 2023 will undertake an internship with the Irish Parliament.

venues – which I conceptualize as ‘urban stages’ – of Prides within Italy produce varying kinds of visual framing devices (e.g posters, pamphlets, slogans, etc.) based on their unique environments? I hypothesize that activist framing is context-dependent and is based on a unique relationship between queer activists and their specific socio-political and geographical environment.³ This could include the makeup of a city, including its level of religiosity, political history, and the urban makeup of its population. Moreover, activists package their protest ideas with the aim of the greatest impact in their urban environment.

Within my case studies, I theorize that Bolognese activists will utilize more radical framing tactics, such as mocking religious iconography and calling upon communist or socialist rhetoric, while Rome’s Prides will utilize more universalist human rights claims. This paper does not develop a completely new theoretical framework, but synthesizes existing arguments, combining social movement theory, event studies, European studies, and queer theory.

Specifically, I draw from Meyer’s work, honing in on the power of collective identity and social movement framing to “challenge dominant meaning systems,” which manifest in visible articulations of localized queerness that I coin as queer social artifacts.⁴ From these theoretical foundations, I deconstruct the puzzle of Italian LGBTQ+ social movement organizing by zooming in on the urban stage of Pride and conducting a comparative case study analysis between Bologna and Rome. Thus, my work may have wider theoretical and practical implications than available within the limited scope of my research, such as on same-sex marriage legality in Italy and the success of international LGBTQ+ rights coalitions. While the formal institutional impact, such as legal or public policy change, is not the focus of my research, I corroborate Meyer’s theories that social movements and their activities have ripple effects beyond formal channels through a “spillover effect”.⁵

2. Il Bel Paese (The Beautiful Country) - The Case of Italy

My focus on Italy is derived from Colpani (2014) and Peterson’s (2018) discussion of Italy being in the periphery of progressive Europe. This trope tokenizes Europe as a bastion a “horizon of progressivism” within political discourse, which political actors utilize as a framing tool to fulfill promises of sexual freedom.⁶ Therefore, Colpani conflates

3 Queer/queerness utilized throughout this senior comprehensive as an umbrella term for those on the LGBTQIA+ spectrum, while also validating its history as a derogatory slur within colloquial dialect. LGBT is used throughout to refer to Abbreviation for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender. (Perlman, 2019, 2)

4 Meyers, Protest and Political Opportunities, 126; Meyers, Social Movement Spillover, 277

5 Ibid, 278.

6 Colpani, What is European about Homonationalism? Thinking Through the Italian Case, 24

progressiveness solely with metropolitan locations in the Global North, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States.

In contrast, I seek to show that the Italian LGBTQ+ movement can produce progressive framing tactics even if deemed a “peripheral country.”⁷ I view local cities within Italy as “active laboratories of grass-roots self-organization,” which must be studied to counter reductionist claims that solely focus on LGBTQ+ organizing at the national level.⁸ I break with traditional social movement theory’s focus on the state as the main target of collective action.⁹ Instead, my research presents Pride in different Italian cities as direct reflections of localism, which ultimately rejects a nationalistic “blueprint mentality” often found in the field of identity politics.¹⁰

3. Why the City?

Within the urban Italian city, there exists an inherent tension between Italian heteronormative public spaces and queerness, which naturally brings my academic focus to the queer subject and its relationship to the cities it inhabits. I support this claim within the context of Italy’s slow acceptance of LGBTQ+ identities due to the Vatican’s historical condemnation of homosexual practices. This relationship has become physically ingrained in the makeup of the Italian piazza, or town square, in which the public commons centers around a Christian site of worship (e.g., Cathedral, or Church).¹¹ Therefore, even though homosexuality was technically decriminalized in 1890, queerness remains taboo within modern Italian culture.¹² Because of this inherent tension, the city becomes the perfect fora to analyze localized framing of the Italian LGBTQ+ movement.

Furthermore, the proliferation of queer activism has often centered in urban spaces, making the city a natural focus in my academic inquiry. Specifically, Bell and Binnie (2004) coined the term for this relationship between queerness and the city as a “new urban order,” which uses the stage of the city to support the mobilization of the sexual deviant “other” in a process of urban transformation.¹³ Specifically, new global cities allowed for greater anonymity for the queer subject and provided spaces for the LGBTQ+ community to congregate and mobilize, culminating in a new “urban species” that birthed deviant forms of politics and identity.¹⁴ Thus, Bell & Binnie highlight the historical linkage

7 De Felicianantonio, Exploring the Complex Geographies of Italian Queer Activism, 28

8 Di Felicianantonio, In Italy It’s Different: Pride as a Space of Political Contention, 26

9 Polletta, Collective Identity and Social Movements, 283

10 Nardi, The Globalization of the Gay & Lesbian Socio-Political Movement, 569

11 Peterson et al., The Histories of Pride, 49

12 Ibid, 48.

13 Bell and Binnie, Authenticating Queer Space: Citizenship, Urbanism and Governance, 1808

14 Ibid, 1809.

between the proliferation of globalization, the urban city, and queer liberation.¹⁵ While I validate that queer activism can occur within non-urban spaces and assert the need to not “mythologize” or romanticize the city, I view cities as prime sites where identity is mobilized.¹⁶ Overall, I choose the micro-dimension of the local to deconstruct how people appropriate queer identities and articulate them in specific geo-social locations, crafting a comparative analysis of two Italian urban cities, Bologna and Rome.¹⁷

4. Why Pride?

I choose Pride events as my focus for LGBTQ+ social movements due to research feasibility, as they act as tangible active sites of queer identity and protest, but also due to their historical significance to the LGBTQ+ social movement as a galvanizing political force.¹⁸ The proliferation of Pride Protests as a radical means of LGBTQ+ visibility and political resistance has its roots in the gay rights movements of the 1960s and 70s.¹⁹ In 1969, queer radicals in New York City, who were tired of social discrimination and police harassment, started a protest outside the gay bar known as the Stonewall Inn.²⁰ Working off unifying slogans, such as “Silence = Death” and “Aids die-ins,” their actions reverberated and became “a beacon for (gay) people around the world.”²¹ It is essential to note that a large portion of the leaders for this movement were from communities of color, specifically trans women of color and Black lesbians like Marsha P. Johnson, Sylvia Rivera, Miss Major Griffin-Gracy, and Stormé DeLarverie.²²

A faction of academics and LGBTQ+ social movement activists have epitomized the Stonewall Riot as a catalyzing event in the gay liberation movement, proliferating into what we now know as Pride.²³ Chauncey (1994) describes this Stonewall phenomenon as an “international commemorative ritual - an annual gay pride parade.”²⁴ Modern-day activists frequently conceptualize gay history within the confines of “before Stonewall” and “after Stonewall.”²⁵ I attempt to deconstruct the “Stonewall Myth” present in academic literature that Pride originated primarily from the Stonewall protests in the United States, as LGBTQ+ activism has roots in many other cultures around the world.²⁶ Therefore, I

15 Ibid, 1810.

16 Ibid.

17 Ammaturo, *The More South You Go, the More Frankly You Can Speak*, 82

18 Peterson, *The Histories of Pride*, 18

19 Ibid, 19.

20 Laux, *Stonewall Riots: A Beacon for People around the World?*,

21 Laux, *Stonewall Riots: A Beacon for People around the World?*, 4

22 JFCS Chicago, *The History of Pride Part 2: Don't Forget the Leaders of the Movement*, 1

23 Chauncey, *Gay New York*, 10

24 Ibid, 11.

25 Ibid, 17.

26 Ibid, 15.

corroborate the value of studying forms of LGBTQ+ protest outside the Global North and I place my work within the wider academic discourse of decolonizing queer studies.²⁷

5. Why Bologna & Rome?

The cities of Rome and Bologna present ideal case studies to conduct work on localized framing tactics within the context of Italian Pride. The two cities have diverging histories, including in the areas of political affiliation, levels of religiosity, population makeup, and public policy, which allow enough divergence to produce contrasting frame negotiation, while still having active LGBTQ+ communities to produce adequate qualitative data. At the same time, the two cities share many similarities, which allows me to “control” for various factors, including levels of national democracy and legality of LGBTQ+ organizing.

Specifically, from its roots in progressivism, socialism, and communism, Bologna presents as a strong oppositional comparison to Rome, which has a more religious and conservative past based in Fascism, Catholicism, and Nationalism, especially with the insurgence of the alt-right in the mid-1990s to mid-2000s with Prime Minister Berlusconi and his Forza Italia party.²⁸ While Bologna was not the first Italian city to host Pride, the city has historical precedent for progressive queer social mobilization through the medium of Pride. The country’s largest and later only nationalized LGBTQ+ human rights organization, Arcigay, was founded in Bologna in 1985 and the second national Gay and Lesbian Pride Parade occurred in Bologna in 1995.²⁹

Furthermore, the Italian Communist Party has historically been strongest in the central part of the country, including the Emilia-Romagna region in which Bologna is located. During World War II, the city was heavily involved in antifascist campaigns and political movements with Bologna’s partigiani (partisans) earning the city the gold medal of resistance fighting against Benito Mussolini from 1922 to 1945.³⁰ This progressive political resistance and activism continued into the 1970s with anti-government student protests, which culminated in a wave of socialist policies being enacted by the municipal government in education, transportation, city-planning, and housing.³¹ The city’s official statement at the time explained the aims of these policies were to create “the type of young person who has learned to understand, who knows how to change things, and who wants

27 Atshan, *On Decolonizing Queer Studies*, 1

28 Albertazzi, *The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government*, 953

29 Ross, *Collective Association in LGBT Movements*, 204

30 Ross, *Collective Association in LGBT Movements*, 206

31 Clemons et al., *Red Bologna Today*, 1

to change them”.³² During the late 2010s, the city saw leftist political mobilization with the birth of “Il Movimento delle Sardine” in 2019 (The Sardinian Movement), which sought to fight against the growing power of the right in Italy, such as the Five Star Movement and Forza Italia.³³ Thus, studying the stage of Pride in Bologna can foster essential insights into how the city’s socialist roots have been appropriated by 21st century LGBTQ+ activists in their framing tactics during Pride.

Rome presents a clear contrast to Bologna due to its status as an international Sacred City because of the presence of the Vatican and its modern-day roots in political conservatism during the era of Forza Italia and Berlusconi.³⁴ Regarding its sacrality, the construction of Rome has been historically steeped in Catholic control, even being imbued in the physical makeup and planning of the city, which has historically been controlled by the Church with over 900 churches within the city limits.³⁵ This high level of religiosity in the city has created “an aesthetic of sacred space and time through a rich metaphorical language.”³⁶ Thus, the presence of Catholicism is inescapable within public spaces in Rome, which are often also used and appropriated by LGBT activists during Pride. In addition, scholars studying Rome see an inherent tension occurring within the status of being a global secular city and the hub of catholic sacrality. This forms an urban stage ripe with conflicting loci of identities and protest materializations, making the city a rich academic puzzle for studying localized Pride framing.³⁷ This inherent religiosity in the makeup of Rome lies in contrast to Bologna’s socialized city planning codes, which were enacted in the 1970s by the student protests.³⁸

Regarding Rome’s political culture, it has long been impacted by the national politics of the country and its current political party in charge as the seat of the Italian national government. Specifically, the city has a recent history in conservatism and nationalism with the birth of the Forza Italia (Let’s Go Italy) movement in 1993 by Silvio Berlusconi and the alt-right Lega Nord that was founded in 1991 by Umberto Bossi and which supported Berlusconi in his 2018 election campaign.³⁹ Forza Italia’s political platform centered around “the ideals of liberal democratic, liberal Catholic, secular and reformist European traditions”, including being stepped in openly homophobic and misogynistic rhetoric, such Berlusconi stating that his “passion for women was better than being gay”

32 Ibid, 2.

33 Albertazzi, *The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government*, 953

34 McNeill, *Rome, Global City? Church, State, and the Jubilee 2000*, 542

35 Ibid, 541.

36 Ibid, 540.

37 Ibid, 542.

38 Clemons et al., *Red Bologna Today*, 2

39 Edwards, *Political Cheat Sheet: Understanding Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia Party*, 2

(2010) and that in "In Italy, only communists and gays are sanctified."⁴⁰ Combined with Lega Nord's strong anti-immigrant stance, the recent history of Rome's national government presents itself in direct contrast to Bologna's socialism.⁴¹

Despite its comparatively higher levels of conservatism, Rome still has a history ripe with LGBTQ+ political protest and frame negotiation, with the Euro Pride of 2000 acting as a turning point in queer visibility.⁴² Additionally, due to both Rome and Bologna's high student population and levels of urbanism, there exists a plethora of activist movements around LGBTQ+ rights to expand upon and compare within their contrasting urban settings. Overall, Rome provides an interesting comparison point to the political history of Bologna, which has more radical and secularized roots within the 20th and 21st century, while still providing complex histories of queer activism to draw from in both local contexts.

6. Literature Review

Below I deconstruct various academic debates that address Pride within the LGBTQ+ social movement theory and academic discourse. I will focus on three different ideas from existing scholarship, which pit Pride as a: 1) A space of Commodification 2) Radical Queerness & Collective Action, and 3) Potential Endangerment. While I agree that this literature has charted salient dynamics, scholars and activists still know too little about why Prides are so different, and why some theories [or as I posit, theoretical camps] are more accurate than others. For instance, why are some Prides commodified, and others truly political demonstrations? And why does this variation among Prides exist insularly within countries? I argue that the urban stage of the city is key in explaining this variation.

Camp A: Pride of a Space of Commodification

Scholars in Camp A highlight the hegemonic mainstreaming of Pride Parades. Within this discourse, Judith Butler's refusal to accept the Civil Courage Award in 2010 becomes an assertion of "the commodified character of the [gay] initiative."⁴³ A portion of scholars theorize Pride as a commercialized extension of the neoliberal and nationalist agenda, resulting in a new version of homonormativity based on capitalistic values at the cost of radical activists' agendas.⁴⁴ I argue that these market values and neoliberalism have

40 Edwards, Political Cheat Sheet: Understanding Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia Party, 3

41 Bremmer, How the European Far-Right Is Growing in Power and Influence, 2

42 McNeill, Rome, Global City? Church, State, and the Jubilee 2000, 537

43 Di Feliciatonio, In Italy It's Different: Pride as a Space of Political Contention, 97

44 Ibid.

seeped more into the framing and urban stage of Roman Pride, due to its status as the capital of Italy and its proximity to the Holy See, which manifests itself in more commercially oriented and less radical in framing tactics.

From a historical lens, scholars in this camp also analyze the later decades of the 20th century within queer movement mobilization as shifting from a revolutionary culture (70s) to one of cultural normalcy (80s), and then in the 90s to “an Anglo-American identity-based political framework.”⁴⁵ I argue that these “Anglo-American identity politics” draw the focus of Pride outside the local make-up of the city, appealing instead to broader transnational themes and an audience that is inherently more commercialized and de-radicalized in its framing devices. Given this precedent, I posit that within the context of Rome’s Pride I will see more references to the Anglo-American queer subject rather than the localized Italian LGBTQ+ community. This may manifest in linguistic usage, such as the greater prevalence of English in Roman Pride protest materials or a greater presence of international organizing bodies and companies. While I validate that a portion of this commercializing lens is due to Rome being the capital city of Italy, Furthermore, it remains important to analyze how Rome’s makeup as a city impacts Pride, who frames it? Who is the intended audience?

Along with this conception of Pride as a space of neoliberalism, scholars have also argued that Pride has become a commodified space for the proliferation of homonationalism. Antonia Ferrante (2014) summarizes this analysis well through her focus on the specific symbols created by the Italian LGBTQ+ community and how they perpetuate images around the fatherland and Italian nationalism.⁴⁶ Frames and symbols used in the Italian LGBTQ+ rights movements have contributed to a new “normative project of national belonging” where homosexuals are subjected to a subordinate status of citizenship without any measure of protection or civil right.⁴⁷

Scholars also highlight a paradigm between acceptance and assimilation at the heart of the LGBTQ+ movement agenda, conceptualizing pride as a stage of homonationalism “normality” rather than radicalism.⁴⁸ I argue that this normative nationalist agenda and rhetoric will have a more tangible presence in Rome’s Prides rather than Bologna’s due to Rome being the country’s capital city, and its international status economically as a Beta+ city,⁴⁹ which lies in stark contrast to Bologna’s status as a Gamma-city.⁵⁰ In addition,

45 Peterson, *The Histories of Pride*, 49

46 Ferrante, *Homo Skin, Hetero Masks. A Representation of Italian Homonationalism*, 114

47 *Ibid.*

48 *Ibid.*, 115.

49 Beta level cities are cities that link moderate economic regions to the world economy and are classified into three sections. The Globalization and World Cities Research Network (GaWC) is a think tank that studies the relationships between world cities in the context of globalization (Nasr, 2021, 1)

50 Cities that are only connected to a small economic region to the world economy (Nasr, 2021, 1).

being the international seat of Christendom, I posit that more references to nationalism, religion, and the state will be inherently ingrained in the meaning-making process of Roman Pride.

Camp B: Pride as a Space of Radical Queerness & Collective Action

In contrast, other scholars still view Pride as a stage of radical queer visibility and performance through collective action, which produces “active sites of production of LGBTQ+ identities” and “spatial articulations of political and human rights claims.”⁵¹ These scholars make a case for Pride being physical materializations of queer community beyond borders, that aim to challenge the socio-political status quo and develop distinct “collective imaginaries in different national contexts.”⁵² Within these collective imaginaries or urban stages, localized framing creates a unique visual repertoire for activists.⁵³ I use this theoretical framework to argue that Bologna and Rome will produce different framing tactics based on their distinct urban environments. Furthermore, I use Rushbook’s theory within this theoretical camp to support studying the queer subject through the medium of the public space, who “temporarily subverts heteronormative spatial organization in an intense moment of cultural creation.”⁵⁴ Within the context of my study, public spaces in Bologna and Rome becomes an urban stage in which queer activists perform queerness by constructing and assigning framing tactics based in local contextualization. This dynamic between the urban stage and queer subject manifests in a “dynamic and multilevel of queerification”, validating my focus on identity-mediation and localized framing negotiation rather than political instrumentality.⁵⁵

I also seek to apply this camp’s ideology around Pride acting as a stage for the temporary subversion of heteronormative and religious public space. Specifically, Brink-schröder (2011) argues that Pride has historically been used as a stage in Italy to call out to the Church and appropriate religious symbols and rhetoric to foster LGBTQ+ community empowerment. Through the appropriation of holy rhetoric, Italian activists seek not only to increase queer visibility, but flip inherent power scripts and hierarchies engrained in their urban environment.

Overall, Camp B provides a roadmap for investigating how LGBTQ+ identities are constructed in the public sphere and how queer identity is negotiated with other powerful political and religious actors in a process called “queering the public space.”⁵⁶ For my

51 Ammaturo, *The More South You Go, the More Frankly You Can Speak*, 19

52 *Ibid.*

53 *Ibid.*, 20.

54 *Ibid.*, 24.

55 Van Doorn, *Protest against Whom?: The Role of Collective Meaning Making in Politicization*, 59

56 Ammaturo, *The More South You Go, the More Frankly You Can Speak*, 20

research, I draw from these theories most heavily, applying them within the local context of Bologna and Rome to see how Pride has become a ritualized moment in its unique urban context.

Camp C: Pride as a Space of Potential Endangerment

While Pride events are breeding grounds for collective political action, they also give rise to conservative counter-movements, which can have harmful effects both on the political success and the safety of LGBTQ+ Pride events. A section of scholars within European social movement studies focuses on these “counter-movement consequences,” citing that many conservative national actors have emerged through the medium of Pride who are “devoted to ‘traditional values’ and opposed to ‘sinfulness’” of the gay community.⁵⁷ This camp of scholars recognizes the growth in the 21st century of right-wing movements, such as ethnonationalism and gender ideology movements, who often capitalize on the stage of Pride to promote their own frames and political causes.⁵⁸

As Ayoub, Page, and Whittnote note, Pride activists often mobilize along with other counter-resistance groups due to the heightened media and public visibility. This increased attention at times perpetuates threats against the LGBTQ+ community, who are labeled as “unnatural, sick, criminal, foreign, sinful, or a threat to national identity or religious values.”⁵⁹ Therefore, even though counter-protests are not a strong emphasis in my own research, given the current anti-gender and anti-LGBTQ+ campaigns in Europe,

I validate the significance of this camp’s ideological arguments.⁶⁰ In addition, academics within this camp have noted the ideological pitfalls present within Pride, such as a hyper focus on visibility and coming out. Specifically, coming out has been problematized by Judith Butler, who argues that “the binary opposition in/out implies ... true or essential identity, which of course never existed.”⁶¹ Camp C not only views Pride as a facilitator of counter movement insurgence, which puts queer bodies in harm’s way, but as a stage to perpetuate the trope of coming out.⁶² Within this trope, the queer subject must bring its sexuality into the public sphere to be deemed worthy of praise, visibility, and human rights. Thus, these scholars view Pride as perpetuating negatively coded mainstream socio-cultural discourses.⁶³

While these negative facets to Pride are not the focus of my scholarly inquiry, the

57 Ayoub et al., *When States Come Out*, 467

58 *Ibid*, 468.

59 Ayoub et al., *When States Come Out*, 470

60 Kuhar, *Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe*, 16

61 Butler, *Violence, Mourning, and Politics*, 5

62 Ross, *Visions of Visibility: LGBT Communities in Turin*, 224

63 *Ibid*.

interaction between queer subjects and anti-LGBTQ+ actors proves fruitful for discourses on frame negotiation. Notably, I have seen through my research the recurring appropriation of slurs used in counter-movement culture, such as *frocchio* (faggot), becoming adopted as framing tactics by the LGBTQ+ community within the urban stage of Pride. Therefore, while I validate the shortcomings and potential danger of the stage of Pride, I also view interactions with counter movements forces as potential sites where hierarchies between queer bodies and heteronormative/religious spaces can be flipped on their head. This positive appropriation will be more visible in my qualitative data sections in later sections.

Overall, I seek to focus less on one theory, as this leads to reductionism, but to compare and contrast manifestations of these ideological camps within the case studies of Rome and Bologna. My goal is to develop greater critical regionality within queer scholarship, allowing for context-specific insight into activist framing and “queering the streets”.

7. Methods

I utilize a mixed-methods approach that combines ethnographic data collection and a comparative case study design inspired by Francesco Ammaturo’s 2016 article *A Visual Ethnography of Gay Pride Parades in Italy and the United Kingdom*. Visual ethnography is defined by Ammaturo as “a research methodology that brings “theory and practice of visual approaches to learning and knowing about the world and communicating these to others.”⁶⁴ I expand on Ammaturo’s approach by comparing thematic frames used by Pride organizers in Bologna and Rome, chronicling the level of radicalness of these themes in each of their local fora, such as the histories of the piazzas or city centers.⁶⁵

I use a variable-based research design to trace the relationship between my dependent variable (the level of radicalness of Pride framing tactics) and several potential independent variables - Political History, Religiosity, Economy, and Population Demographics (See Figure B). I chose these independent variables due to both the feasibility of comparison in my case studies in these areas and the well-documented scholarly evidence within social movement studies of their impact on the salience of orienting frames within activism campaigns.⁶⁶ Furthermore, the comparison of two cities in one country allows me to “control for” and rule out major socio-cultural variables, including the level of democracy in the country, the legality of LGBT identities and acts (e.g. same-sex relations, marriage, etc.), and national laws around Pride organizing/protest in public spaces. The below figures summarize these dependent and independent variables used throughout the

64 Ammaturo, *Spaces of Pride: A Visual Ethnography of Gay Pride Parades*, 25

65 *Ibid.*, 26.

66 Snow, *A Primer on Social Movements*, 251; Jasper, *Protest: A Cultural Introduction to Social Movements*, 26

Figure B. Dependent Variable (DV) & Independent Variables (IV)

Variables	Case Study A: Bologna Pride	Case Study B: Roma Pride
DV (<i>The level of radicalness of Pride framing tactics</i>)	Hypothesis - more radical levels of Pride framing	Hypothesis - less radical levels of Pride framing
IV (<i>The urban makeup of each city</i>)	Political History - Communism & Socialism ⁶⁷	Political History - Mixed - Conservative Nationalism & Recently Social Democracy ⁶⁸
	Religiosity - Lower with modern secularism & growth of other faith communities, such as the Muslim community ⁶⁹	Religiosity - Higher (<i>Home to Vatican & high presence of Catholicism</i>) ⁷⁰
	Economy - Gamma minus city (<i>cities that link smaller economic regions to the global economy</i>) -GDP- €35 billion (2017) ⁷¹	Economy - Beta + city (<i>cities that link moderate economic regions to the world economy</i>) - GDP- €163.14 billion Euros (2017/2018) ⁷²
	Population Demographics - 7th most populous in Italy & Capital of Emilia-Romagna -High international presence & large international student population (Home to the oldest university in the Western world) ⁷³	Population Demographics - Most populous city in Italy & Capital city of Italy/the Lazio region - High international presence & large international student population (many universities & pontifical colleges) ⁷⁴

research process.

While my research remained solely remote due to the constraints of the COVID-19 pandemic, I was still able to accomplish my aim of cataloging sites of localized frame negotiation. To properly analyze the impacts of my independent variables on my dependent variables, I collected data from roughly 2014 to the present from the official Pride Facebook pages of each city and using a few anonymous contacts to collect Pride photography and materials. In total, I cataloged approximately 300 photos and 100 Pride Posters, analyzing the content based on five key thematic elements used in each city, which will be introduced in the following section. Citations for all photos used come from these sources unless other citations are given.⁶⁷

8. Quantifying The Radicalness of Pride

Pride events provide stages for understanding how local queer activists frame their claims and identities. The thematic interpretation of official Pride posters offers a unique opportunity to establish a visual repertoire of localized framing tactics and their relationship to the urban city.⁶⁸ In addition, the medium of the poster provides an increased level of protest resonance due to the increased dissemination of material via the internet and LGBTQ+ protest taking up both physical and digital activism space. I also turn to the medium of photography, which documents an active moment in time of queer social mobilization and the localized fora in which it is enacted. Ammaturo describes this

67 Facebook, Roma Pride, Accessed February 13, 2022; Facebook, Bologna Pride, Accessed February 12, 2022

68 Ammaturo, Spaces of Pride: A Visual Ethnography of Gay Pride Parades, 20

process as “cataloging social behavior through the photograph.”⁶⁹

Thus, the ritualized moment of the urban stage of Pride can be captured through the lens of the camera, documenting queer bodies in “active framing laboratories.”⁷⁰ The analysis in my findings sections represents a catalogue of localized queer activism by analyzing queer Pride social artifacts.⁷¹ The organization schema for the data is arranged by six themes - The State & Politics, History, Religion, The Market, and Framing Rhetoric - to provide a visual mapping of differing framing during Pride. These six thematic categories allow for greater analysis of localized differences in framing tactics between Bologna and Rome.

While I validate other forms of organization, I found this to be the most fruitful for my research documentation, especially due to the impact of COVID on organizing from 2020 to the present. Posters presented were at times limited some years due to less social media coverage of the event, which is reflected in not having social artifacts for every Pride year represented. Through this “mapping of queer experiences and identities” in the first two findings’ sections of my qualitative data collection design, I produce queer academic bodies of knowledge that empower queer activists on the ground in Italy, while providing a well-rounded analysis of the protest tactics of Pride in Bologna and Italy.⁷²

9. The Unit of Analysis

Queer Social Artifacts

I posit that the manifestation of the levels of Pride radicality leaves lasting physical traces, which I coin as queer “social artifacts.”⁷³ Arising not as inherent entities, but informed through their localized contexts, I center on these social artifacts as manifestations of framing negotiation in Bologna and Rome, which signal the ritualized nature of Pride.⁷⁴ Focusing on photography, posters, music, and video, I use social artifacts as a basis for my visual ethnographic data analysis, deconstructing the “symbolic stage” of Pride where space, people, frames, and emotions collide and are negotiated.⁷⁵ I seek to show how Pride “social artifacts” marks moments of queer collective mobilization within

69 Ibid, 22.

70 Ibid, 24.

71 Ibid, 21.

72 Ross, *Visions of Visibility: LGBT Communities in Turin*, 400

73 Ammaturo, *The More South You Go, the More Frankly You Can Speak*, 26

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid, 27.

their local urban environment.⁷⁶

Protest Photography

I draw from the scholarly precedent of “protest photography” as one of my main sources for my qualitative data. Specifically, Dr. Tamar W. Carroll (2021) supports the use of photography to develop queer histories through his multi-media installation “Social protest photography and public history: “Whose streets? Our streets!”: New York City, 1980–2000”, which uses photography to capture civil rights protests from the 1970s and 1980s.⁷⁷ Carroll summarizes the power of photography as “centering the experience of marginalized groups and individuals, which allows for the presentation of a more inclusive historical narrative.”⁷⁸ Dr. Nan Alamilla Boyd and Dr. Horacio Ramirez (2012) further epitomize the essentialism of the camera to promote queer visual histories and queer liberation as it produces “multi-layered textures and meanings” of qualitative analysis beyond traditional textual analysis as they bring to life “untold stories and invisible lives”, humanizing the queer subject and its struggle.⁷⁹ I seek to deconstruct the framing of Bolognese and Roman Pride through the medium of photography, crafting LGBT scholarly archives and oral histories rooted in the queer Italian subject.

10. Theory: Frames, Social Artifacts & Meaning

Through my research, I attempt to produce a new version of existing Pride studies vocabulary, melding together concepts from queer, urban, and social movement studies to coin the term “queering the streets,” which defines the unique relationship between the dependent variable of levels of radical framing tactics and independent variables associated with the makeup of local city in which they are enacted. Specifically, I combine theories from varying academic sociologists and political scientists within the field of LG-BTQ+ studies and social movement studies, such as Van Doorn’s (2013) “political meaning making,” conceptions of Jasper’s “ritual,” and Brown’s “social movement framing” to posit the need for greater localization when studying Pride parades in scholarly research. I use this theoretical scaffolding to argue that Pride becomes a ritualized moment within the local urban landscape, leading to unique frame negotiation and framing tactics within

76 Ibid.

77 Carroll, *Social Protest Photography and Public History*, 3

78 Ibid, 2.

79 Boyd and Horacio, *Bodies of Evidence: The Practice of Queer Oral History*, 2 - 5.

the local context.

“Political Meaning Making” & Activist Framing

Firstly, I draw from scholarly arguments based in social movements theory about how protesters develop shared understandings of grievances and translate them into understandable political meaning for themselves and other activists using the medium of framing.⁸⁰ Activist frames are defined as “not merely carriers of existing ideas and meaning but ... actively engaged in producing and maintaining meaning” through an interpretative process mediated by culture, which motivates participants to collectively mobilize and gives meaning to their mobilization.⁸¹ Thus, these frames become a mechanism for not only understanding grievances, but working alongside activists to disseminate information and create a collective identity with the goal of collective action. In my research, frames and political meaning making are achieved through activists using Pride as a venue to diagnose and collectively share grievances amongst their fellow LGBTQ+ community, which allows them to collectively choose what tactics to use to rectify those perceived issues.⁸² Pride framing culminates in a “calculated message about who the demonstrators are, what they want, and who is blocking them” from achieving their aims.⁸³

Pride as a “Ritual”

I theorize that the urban environment of Pride is central to LGBTQ+ activism, materializing in a ritualized set of framing tactics.⁸⁴ The ritual in this context is defined as “a formalized mode of behavior in which the members of a group or community regularly engage.”⁸⁵ The makeup of the urban city therefore morphs into “shared (queer) thoughts, feelings, and morals” through the physical embodiments of protest materials and the queer subjects that express them, becoming a mechanism for queer mobilization and empowerment.⁸⁶

This ritualization also speaks to the appropriation of “the ritual” by the queer subject during Pride, specifically as the cultural connotations of rituals in Italy have deep roots in Christian and heteronormative value systems. Within the stage of Pride, what

80 Jasper, *Protest: A Cultural Introduction to Social Movements*, 26

81 Snow, *A Primer on Social Movements*, 51

82 Jasper, *Protest: A Cultural Introduction to Social Movements*, 27

83 *Ibid.*

84 *Ibid.*, 28.

85 UC Davis, *Rituals*, 1

86 Jasper, *Protest: A Cultural Introduction to Social Movements*, 26

once was viewed as the profane subject, the visible queer body, becomes sacred in the annual ritual of Pride through the process of “queering the streets.” This might take the form of varying levels of radicalism through Pride activists using frames to appropriate religious rhetoric and iconography or perform their queerness in historically religious/heteronormative spaces during the act of protest. Overall, I posit Pride has become a “ritualized moment in which the LGBTQ+ person stages specific framing practices” for the aim of communal empowerment.

The Queer Subject & the Codification of Public Space

Additionally, I utilize spatial theories related to the queer subject to show how LGBTQ+ communities interact with their urban environment to disrupt heteronormative spaces through practices of queer embodiment and visibility based in Pride activism and frame negotiation.⁸⁷ Thus, “social spaces are never neutral, but are always codified ... filled with politics and ideology, teeming with discourse.”⁸⁸ Through this assertion of non-neutrality, I foster an inherent politicization and radicalization from the regulation of sexuality and queerness in the urban stage of Pride. Pride activism therefore has the power to challenge heteronormativity through queer activism and queer bodies inhabiting the public sphere.⁸⁹ This queer mobilization counters the inherent heterosexual matrix present within the Italian social and cultural psyche, leading to unique sets of queer “norms (or frames) circulating in and through socio-cultural spaces.”⁹⁰

11. Research Limitations & Queer American Positionality

Although much valuable analysis and insights can be garnered from my data and methods, I validate the inherent limitations of my research. I remained limited in my data collection timeline due to scheduling and remote research conditions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to data gaps, I was only able to conduct a comparative analysis of data derived from Bologna and Rome from 2014 to 2021. While the central aim of this research is to support localized queer activism and frame negotiations, I also validate my positionality as an outsider to these local Italian communities, even despite my year living in Italy from 2017 to 2018 and my identity as a queer activist and scholar. I validate that my positionality as an American scholar will always influence my interpretation of

87 Ross, *Queer Italian Studies: Critical Reflections from the Field*, XI

88 Ross, “Queering Spaces in Turin” In *Beyond the Piazza*, 2

89 *Ibid.*

90 Butler, *Violence, Mourning, and Politics*, 2

framing tactics and the queer subject. To counteract these limitations as much as possible, I have made every attempt to develop a strong research methodology that analyzes queer protest social artifacts from primary sources, draws from academics who have conducted significant on the ground field work, and promotes dialogue with local Italian LGBTQ+ activists and LGBTQ+ Italian scholars to amplify their voices in the process. Due to limitations, I am still constrained in the generalizability of my findings to an associational relationship between the makeup of the city and the radicalness of framing tactics.

12. Findings: "Il Poster Tematico & La Fotografia"

The Thematic Poster & Photography: A Visual Manifestation of Protest Tactics

Bologna

“Liberation & Revolution from the State”

Through the medium of queer posters, Bolognese Pride organizers attempted to not only associate the city of Bologna with revolution itself, but also with queer political and bodily liberation. Queer bodies became politicized through the utilization in the below Pride posters of evocative diction, such as oroglio (pride), diritti (rights), corpi (bodies), liberazione (liberation), storia (history), and diversità (diversity). Bolognese posters often acted as a clear call to political and communal arms, which becomes even more evident with the central text reading “Revolution is Bologna ... Bologna is Pride”. This theme of liberation from the state continued with clear framing connections to other leftist and radical movements to Pride, such as surrounding the statement Revolution is Bologna with antifascismo (antifascism), antisessimo (antisexism), accesso al lavoro (job accessibility), and migrante (migrant). These posters are a clear statement of what values Bolognese Pride organizers want their localized version of Pride to stand for. They act as an orienting frame for Pride Bologna, and allude to a clear relationship between the state and queer bodies, which is oriented in political radicalism, bodily autonomy, and an im-

age of resistance based on the character of the city itself.

“We Count”- *Localized Politics*



The Bolognese Pride case study also utilized claims around national and local belonging, capitalizing on slogans such as *Contiamo* (We Count) to assert connections between LGBTQ+ identity and localized politics. Through this assertion of belonging combined with framing Bolognese Pride as a “manifestation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexuals” (poster above on the left), Pride organizers in Bologna frame Pride as a space of belonging for all regardless of gender or sexual orientation. Furthermore, through the sign *Pride libera tutt** (Pride liberates everyone), organizers deconstruct Italian gendered linguistic usages, which are founded in labeling everything as either masculine or feminine, to capitalize on connections between localized Bolognese politics, queerness, and “counting” within society. In addition, the above posters highlight an orientation towards the local by orienting Bolognese Pride around symbols of the city, such as *Le Due Torri* (the two towers), which enforces conceptions of belonging as locally recognized monuments of the city becomes visually associated with queerness and become rainbow in their

relationship will be further explored in later research sections.

Rome

“Transnationalism & The European Trope”

Under the category of State & Politics, Roman Pride organizers utilized the common trope of Europe as a “bastion of political liberation”, asserting that “with Europe, the region of Lazio, Italy is stronger” to assert claims of LGBTQ+ rights. By connecting the liberation of Roman LGBTQ+ people to the strength of Europe, Roman Pride inherently ties queer liberation to transnational European politics. Through connecting Roman Pride with innovation, Rome Pride organizers utilized the trope of European modernity to appeal to a connection between progressive European ideals and the Roman LGBTQ+ community, legitimizing the event in transnational spaces and constructing an LGBTQ+ political identity founded in European transnationalism. This tie to modernity represents both a similarity and difference to other Bolognese Pride framing by asserting European progressivism and the Bolognese “Bringing the Transnational to the Local”, while also contrasting with the Bolognese framing centered on the local and queer bodily liberation from the State. These findings complicate my thesis, highlighting that transnationalism, localism, and radicalism can occur in both Bologna and Rome.

“God, State & Bodily Autonomy”

The last framing device related to the State & Politics found within Roman Pride was the relationship between God, State, and LGBTQ+ bodily autonomy. Roman Pride organizers framed the stage of Pride as a rejection of Church and State over the autonomous LGBTQ+ subject, such as the above sign “Nor state, nor God on my [queer] body”. This Roman framing mirrors radical framing found in the Bolognese case study, specifically concerning the politicization of the queer body and its liberation from the state. Although these Roman frames do present as progressive framing tactics, they lack the specificity and localization found in Bologna’s orienting framing, such as the use of specific localized orienting events or allusions to past city-based protest movements, which is seen in the

history section below.

13. History

Bologna

“A Shared Queer History - The Gay Socialist Collective of Bologna”

Bolognese Pride activists rooted their activist framing in allusions to Bolognese LGBTQ+ historical sites and transgressive events in their city’s history, utilizing Bologna’s roots in socialism and communism as orienting mechanisms to bolster LGBTQ+ claims in the present. The 2020 Bolognese Pride campaign highlights a unique manifestation of these claims using classical Roman imagery in Pride posters paired with signs of modernity. Through utilizing images of modernity, such as a telephone, the symbol for WIFI, and a tablet in the hands of the Romans, the poster seeks to create a visual bridge between modernity, queerness, and the roots of the Italian nation-state.

Coupled with the phrase *Prendiamola con Filosofia* (We take it with philosophy), the poster becomes a call towards being Proudful of one’s queer identity, which has existed in Italy since antiquity. Just as Roman monuments have cultural validity and value within the Italian psyche, so too can the LGBTQ+ community. Again, this framing based on a greater national LGBTQ+ history represents a divergence from my argument of Pride as based in the local, ultimately showing a greater complexity to radicalness and Pride framing than once posited. Thus, my findings show that nationalized Pride discourses can also be radical in their framing.

Despite these findings, Bolognese Pride organizers still utilized localized progressivism based on local history in their 2020 Bolognese Facebook Pride Campaign framing. Using Facebook, Bolognese Pride activists capitalized on photographs as a mechanism to tell their community’s story. Specifically, they used Facebook to mobilize the Bolognese LGBTQ+ community members to visit historic LGBTQ+ sites in Bologna instead of a more formalized Pride due to the COVID-19 pandemic. By mentioning specific areas in which LGBTQ+ activists “queered the streets in the past,” present-day activists drew from a cultivated shared past to unite the Bolognese LGBTQ+ community in the present. I include three sites below that were mentioned in this 2020 Pride Campaign along with their

accompanying historical context.

“Communism & “La Sala Borsa”

Bolognese Pride framing also capitalized on the city’s socialist and communist roots to develop narratives of historical continuity. The Sala Borsa is the central public library in Bologna and is historically significant as a commemorative site for communist resisters of Nazi occupation during World War II. Through transgressive rhetoric like “Fuck Gender” being presented in front of the Sala Borsa, Bolognese queer activists strategically utilize both their city’s history and their unique urban landscape to assert claims of Pride radicalism. Overall, Bolognese Pride protesters capitalize on historical monuments like La Sala Borsa to create localized meaning and resonance for their political claims.

“Socialism & Kiss-ins”

Furthermore, activists in Bologna also drew upon the city’s radical past, such as historical protest tactics grounded in socialism and resistance movements of the 20th century. Photography provides a clear link between the Italian communist party’s presence in the city in the first half of the 20th century and the city’s progressive politics in the 21st century. Through activists framing their Pride participation in the context of socialism, they actively utilize progressive activist tactics of the past.

“Kiss-ins” were another such tactic, which draw upon international actor repertoire of performing queer sexuality in deemed heteronormative spaces as transgressive and liberating acts. In addition, the tactic has an implicit connection to the “Die-in” tactic used during the 1990s AIDS movement, which demanded attention to the public health crisis by simulating death. The tactic also has historical precedent with “suffragettes chaining themselves to railings” in the early 20th century during the Western Women’s Liberation Movement.⁹¹ Thus, through allusion to past radicalism combined with queer sexuality based on the present, protesters foster civil disobedience and radical framing.⁹² Overall, this section supports Bolognese Pride framing drawn from both localized and interna-

91 Montalvo, *How AIDS Activists Used 'Die-Ins to Demand Attention to the Growing Epidemic*, 2

92 *Ibid.*, 3.

tional social movements, presenting a divergence from my original thesis.

Bologna

“The Western Queer Celebrity & Coming Out”

In contrast, common Roman Pride historical framing centered around international queer historical figures rather than the localized Italian queer subject. This can be seen in the poster that features well-known, Western queer icons, such as American gay liberation activist, Marsha P. Johnson, Harvey Milk, and Leonardo Maltovick (First American soldier to come out). Based on this common theme of using internationally recognized LGBTQ+ celebrities from mainly the Global North, Roman Pride politics supports Pride as an extension of “Anglo-American identity politics.”

While some Italian activists make it into the rotation, such as Zia Karl, the majority of historical figures mentioned in Roman Pride were internationally-oriented rather than locally-based. Although, it is essential to not undervalue the radicalism around the framing of Zia Karl, who was one of the most beloved drag queens in Italy. Before their passing in 2018, Zia Karl was head of the press office of the homosexual culture club Mario Mieli (the Roman LGBTQ+ organization that organizes Roman Pride), a civil rights activist, and a drag queen. Acting as a fundamental point of reference for the Italian homosexual and transsexual movement, they had been involved in Italian LGBTQ+ activism from the start in 1994 “always accompanied armed with a microphone, wig, and sequins. Zia Karl acts as a direct framing foil to more Westernized celebrity iconography, showing the need to greater dissect framing quantity versus resonance in future research endeavors.

Roman Pride posters also played up histories of necessitating queer subjects to be openly sexual and outed to be deemed worthy of praise, visibility, and human rights. The poster titled “Coming Out” supports this trope regarding historical queer visibility being equated to levels of belonging and social value, which was validated in earlier sections by Judith Butler. These findings in the Rome history section support my thesis of a less radical version of Pride in the Roman case study with an increased emphasis on Western queer celebrities and tropes, yet anomalies like Zia Karl highlight the need for greater

research in this area.

“Stonewall - The First Riot”

Roman Pride also heavily utilized historical appeals towards the 1969 Stonewall Riots in their activist framing. Despite this radical framing of the root of Pride as a riot, Roman activists were still actively orienting themselves within the radicalism of American and Westernized protest rather than grounding themselves in local LGBTQ+ movements in Rome. These findings complicate assumptions in my argument surrounding the connections between radicalism, internationalism, and localism, which necessitate more research in the future on Pride radicalism being tied to international forces, such as transnational activist networks and inter-state actors.

“Local Charities & Grandmother Rome”

A further framing anomaly utilized by Roman Pride activists was the trope of Nonna Roma (Grandmother Rome), which took over a historical protector role during Pride festivities. Specifically, the NGO Nonna Roma was heavily involved in Roma Pride 2020 advertising as a self-professed “association that during quarantine continues to distribute [financial aid] to more than 7500 Roman families.” The use of this trope during Pride to promote localized charity efforts created framing centered around class and socioeconomic status not found in either case study. Therefore, this finding supports additional research into the role that historical economic divisions play in driving Pride framing.

14. History

Bologna

“Fighting Religious Prejudice”

Bolognese Pride's framing utilized themes around fighting religious prejudice, such as historical efforts by the Vatican to criminalize LGBTQ+ acts and stigmatize queer people. Specifically, the 2016 Bolognese Pride poster uses the statement “Thank God It's Pride” paired with images of rainbow unicorns as a clear attempt to counter religious prejudice against Italian LGBTQ+ people. The juxtaposition between the brightly colored Pride Poster and the reference to God creates a clear irony and subversion of the heteronormative space in which religion is usually the one framing queerness as backward or

alien.

“Protest as Appropriation: The Subversion of Religious Hierarchy”

Bolognese Pride activists also appropriated religious iconography in their framing tactics to flip traditional societal power dynamics and produce high levels of radicalism. For instance, a protester from the Bolognese Pride in 2017 participated in the protest with a sign that read “I am a very religious guy, I always kneel in front of a chapel.” Through the appropriation of Catholic religiosity and a classical Roman Toga mixed with the rainbow flag in the background, the activist asserts that the queer subject can be just as Roman and religious as any other citizen without being sinful or foreign. This framing portrays a naturalness to the queer identity, as the queer subject is just as innate as the Roman soldier or an Italian person kneeling at an altar in a chapel.

In addition, another LGBTQ+ activist from that year utilized a similar appropriative narrative with the sign “My squirt is Holy Water.” This transgressive statement flips societal scripts around the taboo and sinful nature of overt queer sexuality, instead, crafting a bridge between the queer body and conceptions of holiness. Both Figures E and F provide evidence for Bologna’s Pride activists subverting conceptions of the profane and appropriating religious iconography, culminating in radical framing tactics.

Rome

“Religious Appropriation - God is a Lesbian Woman”



Roman Pride activists also employed framing tactics around the appropriation of religious iconography. The above images represent common appropriative themes, acting as a visual reimagining by Pride participants of Jesus and God as queer beings. This deliberate framing of Jesus being a figure of queer love, as shown with the hearts on the hands, and rainbow clothing creates a marked departure from the traditional representation by the Vatican. In addition, the signs above on the right, which read “God is a lesbian

woman” and “Gender Anarchy” further highlights Roman Pride activists using the stage of Pride to “queerify history,” remaking the image of God into themselves. Overall, queer bodies in Rome use Pride as a platform to subvert traditional religious hierarchies, which directly contests my original claim of less radical framing occurring in Rome.

Anti-Vatican - “VaticaNO”

In addition, Roman Pride oriented itself around a strong condemnation of the Vatican. The clear slogan of “VaticaNO” and the physical crossing out of images of the Vatican, as seen in many protest signs, highlight a clear orienting frame which uses the stage of Roman Pride to call out the anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric espoused by the Vatican since its inception. Roman Pride framing thus highlights the localized interaction between the queer subject and Rome, which is inherent to the political and religious power of the Vatican in the city’s history. Again, these signs present themselves as in contention with my original claim of less radical framing occurring in Rome, showing the need for greater consideration of the role of religiosity in Italian LGBTQ+ framing in future research queries.

15. The Market

Bologna

“The Local Commune & Arcigay Sponsorship”

Within the market category, Bolognese Pride framing focused on local communal institutions and sponsorship. An event during Bolognese Pride 2019 titled “Homophobia, Bullying, and Cyberbullying” was actively sponsored by the commune of Bologna. The top of the promotional poster reads “Pride financial collaboration for the promotion of the rights of the Bolognese commune.” Even though national and international sponsors are present in Bologna, the focus of Bolognese Pride marketing is on supporting LGBTQ+ people within the city rather than Pride acting as a manifestation of outside consumerism. Similarly, another local advertisement for the 2019 Bolognese Pride reads “Resistant Bodies.” This framing example shows the capacity for local consumer markets, such as advertisements in local papers, to be used to benefit the Bolognese LGBTQ+ community rather than harm it. Overall, Bolognese Pride framing centered on the local with

the ultimate aim to benefit local queer actors.

Rome

“Branding Front & Center”



In contrast, Roman Pride framing placed branding front and center, supporting Pride as a commodifying space and an extension of neoliberal values.⁹³ Specifically, in Roman Pride posters I note the placement of brands over people. Promotional posters for Roman Pride act as examples of this commercialization with “A Casa Della Chef” and “Coop” bolded in their lettering with the Roman Pride logos placed below in smaller print. In addition, while there are still more regional sponsors in the Roman case, such as the above “Chef’s House,” the large majority of branding focused on larger and more international enterprises, such as those mentioned below.

“Neoliberalism - The Influence on Capitalism & Commercialism on Pride’s Scope”



These Roman Pride international sponsors highlight a more capitalistic and commercialized framing of Pride. Sponsors like Ben & Jerry’s seen in the poster on the right not only become central components in advertising posters but in Pride’s yearly official merchandising and event programming as sponsors do not want to be tied to potentially transgressive content. This commercialization impacts the Roman Pride’s scope, aims, and potential political impacts while also representing a larger pattern of Pride proliferating

93 Di Feliciatonio, In Italy It’s Different: Pride as a Space of Political Contention, 97

values of the market economy rather than queerness and radicalism.

16. Framing Rhetoric

Bologna

“Breaking Down Walls”

Bolognese Pride rhetoric honed in on the powerful framing of *Sfondiamo i muri* (We break down the walls) to push for queer liberation. The 2019 Bolognese Pride poster features individuals of diverse body types, sexualities, and gender in defiant poses, alluding to the need for Pride to act as a radical stage of queerness. The use of walls also acts as a metaphor for the historical stigmatization faced by the LGBTQ+ community in Italy, but also locally in the city of Bologna. The use of flowers in the foreground alludes to the potential positive future if the Bolognese LGBTQ+ community can mobilize for their rights, just as the “flowers of revolution” can grow on walls that once divided a community. Lastly, the textual and visual rhetoric of the poster remains inclusive with the banner of *Le Due Torri* (the two towers - a historical monument which has come to represent Bologna) combined with a wide spectrum of listed LGBTQ+ identities, such as “lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans*, queer*,” which strongly tie the history of the city to the liberation of the LGBTQ+ community.

“Revolt”

The 2021 Bologna Pride posters showed direct connections to themes of radicalism as the year’s Pride campaign was “Revolution Pride.” The bright green and pink colors used in the Pride poster framing symbolize the need for a glaring sense of queer visibility and a demand for LGBTQ+ subjects to take up space within the public sphere. The symbol of a hand breaking its chains serves as a direct invocation towards queer bodies breaking the shackles of systematic and social prejudice found within the heteronormative urban context during the stage of Pride. Additionally, the queering of the traditional “breaker of chains symbol” through the long green nails also serve to flip traditional visual framing around gender-norms. Overall, the poster utilizes themes of visibility and revolution

towards supporting the mobilization of radical queerness in Bologna.

“The Non Conventionals”



Bologna Pride 2016 highlighted framing tactics used by Pride attendees around breaking the status quo, countering conventionalist attitudes, and fostering intersectionality. The photograph above features a banner that reads “the non-conventional” and “spaces, bodies, desires.” Through this rhetoric, attendees of Bologna’s Pride recognize that queer bodies and desires exist within the urban setting of Pride, framing Pride in terms of queer liberation and autonomy instead of the shame and stigma traditionally associated with the LGBTQ+ experience. The presence and direct reference of diverse groups of individuals, such as a Buddhist group, directly referencing lesbian sexuality and allusions to God, and having grandmothers in wheelchairs participate in the protest, highlight the true intersectionality present in Bologna’s Pride. Overall, the rhetoric of the “non-conventionals” shows that everyone regardless of gender, sexuality, or any other identity is welcome to participate in Bolognese Pride.

Rome

“Irrepressible Pride”

In contrast, Roman Pride rhetoric focused on slogans, such as orgoglio incontentibile (Irrepressible Pride) and scopriamoci corpi senza confini (Let’s discover our bodies without borders). While this rhetoric does focus on queer claims to visibility and bodily autonomy, it still utilizes a commercialized tone rather than a radical one. Specifically, by focusing solely on the queer subject, but not connecting it to systems of localized and national oppression the claims become less radical (e.g. calling out the state or religious actors). This rhetoric lies in contrast to those found in Bolognese Pride, such as “Breaking Down Walls” and “Revolt.” In addition, various Roman Pride posters reference sponsorship from other countries, such as the Canadian government, creating a heavy

internationalistic framing lens-based outside the local.

“Universalism & Love”

The 2016 Roman Pride theme *Raccontateci la vostra lotta* (Let’s remember our fight), represents the common Roman Pride framing based on love and universalism. While the year’s slogan does reference queer Italian activists’ right for equality and rights, it does not outwardly flip subversive political or religious scripts like those found in Bologna’s posters where God and revolution were referenced. Instead, a vague mention of the LGBTQ+ community’s *lotta* (fight) is highlighted with images of queer individuals and Roman monuments in the background without mentioning what they are fighting for or who they are fighting against. In addition, more references to universal human rights and love were present in Rome’s Pride, such as the affirmation *Amare è un diritto umano* (Love is a human right).

“American Queer Culture - Shantay, You Stay”

Frames built around international queer pop culture were also common in the Roman case study. Many signs at Roman Pride reflect this framing with the quotes from RuPaul’s *Drag Race*, the world’s most famous drag queen television series, including “We’re all born naked, and the rest is drag” and “Shantay you Stay.” These frames develop a clear internationalistic framing pattern, lying in contrast to Bologna’s Pride use of localized queer and political history.⁹⁴

“La Famiglia”

Rome’s 2018 Pride Posters utilized claims based on assimilationism and familial acceptance of the queer subject. The poster below shows a grandmother holding her grandchildren above the slogan *Caro Fontana, la storia ci insegna a resistere l’amore ad esistere* (Dear one, history teaches us to resist love’s existence). This reference to history being the enemy of LGBTQ+ acceptance serves as an allusion to the city’s and country’s conservatism. In addition, the poster also states *Tina 92 anni partigiana, Viola 3 anni, figlia di due mamme* (Tina, a 92 year old supporter - of LGBTQ+ rights, Viola 3 year old, the daughter of two mothers). By showing intergenerational acceptance of LGBTQ+ identity solely through narratives of assimilation and familial values, the radicalism of Pride framing is inhibited. Overall, this assimilationist rhetoric contrasts with the calls for

⁹⁴ Fornas, *Symbols and narratives of Europe: three tropes*, 90

revolution found in Bologna’s Pride framing.



“A Gender Revolution”

The orienting frame of a “Gender Revolution: not having a slogan to contain our identities” presents itself as an anomaly within data on Roman Pride framing. From my hypothesis, one would posit that this framing would occur within the localized context of Bologna due to its progressive history and political affiliations. Therefore, I validate that the Pride framing I have found in each city represents an associational relationship, not one born from direct cause and effect, which is not possible through solely qualitative data collection. In addition, more research is needed on the influence of other transnational and international actors on these localized frames.

17. Conclusion

Through qualitative analysis of Pride social artifacts in Bologna and Rome, my research analyzed how localized frame negotiation generates varying levels of radical activist framing. Overall, my findings did not support the stark delineation in framing originally posited in my thesis, which stated that Bologna would see more radical framing, while Rome would see more universalist and commercialist framing based on their localized urban makeup. Instead, the social artifacts show a more complex relationship between the urban city and Pride activist framing than previously hypothesized. While a large portion of Bolognese Pride framing did capitalize on the city’s radical political history, Bolognese Pride activists still had commercialized and transnational framing elements, such as using the trope of Europe, sponsorship from international brands, and referencing EU funding. In contrast, while Roman Pride was largely influenced by a more commercialized, universal, and international framing approach, radical framing was still present, especially with claims around bodily autonomy and human rights from the Church and

State.

I also recognize that these findings have limitations, such as the restricted years I was able to collect data from (2014 to 2021), and the constricting parameters of a remote research design. While the central focus of my argument still rings, my findings point to a more suggestive relationship between the radicality of Pride framing and the localized urban landscape rather than a direct cause and effect relationship. More research needs to be conducted that includes other factors in Pride framing, such as the impact of transnational activist networks, inter-city actors (e.g. individuals who choose to attend more than one Pride in their home country), and counter mobilization movements. Overall, the growth of my research is possible through additional interviews, more in-depth visual archival research, and in-person field ethnographic work in both cities.

18. Key Takeaways

Despite these limitations and the suggestive nature of my hypothesis, my research still provides substantiate takeaways about the nature of localized Pride framing. I compiled an archive of visual Italian queer history and protest, including photography and social media campaigns, which has never been conducted on such a scale in social movement studies. Furthermore, I showed the necessity of documenting and preserving social artifacts from protest, as they act as insular moments of protesters' imaginaries during activism.

As social artifacts of protest are not just found in LGBTQ+ organizing, more can be studied about how they are formed across the world in different interactions and how they sustain themselves outside their protest microcosm. Examples of artifacts sustaining themselves and becoming naturalized parts of the urban topography include long-lasting murals, ending up as pieces in museums, or becoming parts of city centers through public ordinances.

Potential mediums to support future scholarly studies on Pride and the cultivation of its social artifacts is the creation of a formalized Pride data repository, which could be used by both academics and LGBTQ+ transnational networks to mobilize queer activism across borders. Overall, my research opens new pathways to bolster queer studies within academia, uplift LGBTQ+ activists, and act as a "lightning rod" to understand Pride at the local level. I leave you with this quote, which summarizes my takeaways

regarding the importance of Pride studies at the local level.

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